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Cheer Up 
This Could Have Been Another Advertisement 
By Hank Fincken1 
Things could be worse, you know. 
At home the baby‘s bawling, the neighbor‘s 
Borrowing that bottomless cup of sugar 
(Computer software these days), 
The wife is still rail-splitting mad 
You pioneered new depths last Friday night. 
 
So sit back, quit your bellyaching. 
You‘re cruising along on a whirlwind tour 
Riding beside the community‘s best 
On the move . . . going places . . . 
Listen to the motor‘s whirr – 
You‘re already half way home.  
                                                          
1
 Hank Fincken, ―Cheer Up This Could Have Been Another Advertisement,‖ in Poetry on the 
Buses, edited by Rita Kohn (Indianapolis: IPTC, 1985), 24. 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
“We know that responsibility for the future lies with the present.  How our 
children and grandchildren will live depends on what we do now.  Only 
time will tell whether we possess the foresight and courage to meet the 
challenge of this responsibility.”1 
 
--George Smerk, 1965 
 
Transportation plays a vital role in the development of cities.  Adequate, well-
maintained streets facilitate the traffic flow of automobiles, trucks, and emergency 
vehicles.  Sidewalks allow residents and visitors to traverse the urban center and explore 
cultural sites.  Highways allow suburban commuters to access downtown jobs and 
amenities; they also permit the import and export of essential goods, further connecting 
urban centers and boosting economies.  New middle-class housing developments in and 
around the city are treasured for spacious homes, superior schools, and diverse 
shopping venues all accessible by car.  For some, commuter railroads and buses are 
vital to their daily transportation routines.  Public policy, increased affluence, and 
advances in transportation technology have allowed cities to expand physically and 
thrive economically and culturally.   
Walking cities dominated the American landscape until the mid-nineteenth 
century when mule-pulled streetcars began operating.  Mule-pulled streetcars increased 
the range and speed of the daily commute, which allowed residents to escape the dirty 
downtown for the bucolic suburbs.2  Municipalities required transit companies to 
purchase operating franchises to operate over public streets.  These franchises 
regulated several operating items, including fare price.  Streetcar owners tolerated the 
franchises because the fixed fare, typically between three and five cents, made the 
company significant profits. 
                                                          
1
 George Smerk, Urban Transportation: The Federal Role (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1965), 282. 
2
 See Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
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Technological innovations in mass transit signaled a growth and the beginning of 
transit‘s decline.  Using animals was unsanitary, expensive to maintain and animal 
epidemics devastated service.  Streetcar owners searched for a better technology and 
found it in electricity.  The electrification of streetcars in the late nineteenth century made 
urban public transit more sanitary, increased average speeds and travel distance.  
Electrification allowed suburbs to develop farther out and the streetcar became the 
dominant form of travel from 1890-1930.3  Electrification required a significant capital 
outlay and increased capital maintenance, which coupled with the regulated fare (usually 
five cents), pinned transit companies under nearly unserviceable debt loads.  Mass 
transit‘s popularity and profitability peaked in the 1910s, as the automobile‘s popularity 
increased with transit unable to expand or upgrade, leaving mass transit in most 
communities as a last resort transportation option for urbanites.4 
The urban mass transit industry was in a ragged state by the 1960s, in part 
because of the decay of downtown.  Federal programs designed to provide better 
housing opportunities and better transportation facilities also aided urban residents in 
their suburban flight.  These new federal programs made suburban living affordable and 
accessible.5  Urban blight and crime continued despite the best efforts of municipal 
politicians and inhabitants.  Fleeing residents took both their furniture and their tax 
revenues, often leaving cities with those residents unable to move but demanding 
additional city resources, stretching city budgets.6 
                                                          
3
 David W. Jones, Mass Motorization and Mass Transit (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008), 32-54. 
4
 For a good review of cities and suburbs, see: Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), especially the 
earlier chapters.  For a good review of the decline of the transit industry, see: Jones, Mass 
Motorization, 32-107. 
5
 Jackson, 190-218; James Flink, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, 
Transforming American Life (New York: Viking Press, 1997), 125-175. 
6
 Jackson, 242-243 and 265-271. 
3 
 
Transit ridership and revenues declined in correlation with the decline of the city, 
requiring efficiency tactics and preventing major expansion programs.  Expensive 
suburban routes prohibited cash-strapped private transit companies from suburban 
service.  Suburban residents preferred the privacy of the automobile to the decrepit bus 
service anyway.  The decrepit condition of private transit companies was a result of 
efficiency tactics, where companies deferred maintenance and capital expenditures.  
Others chose to raise fares, decreasing ridership.  State and municipal transit 
regulations made raising fares difficult.  These regulation boards resisted fare increases 
unless non-action meant the company‘s insolvency.  Most companies chose to cut 
service by increasing headways, reducing or eliminating routes.  Headway is the time 
between vehicles on a designated route.7  Increasing headway decreases service time.  
Cutting service was undesirable but easier than raising fares.  Almost all transit 
companies chose to combine one or more of these options.  Dirty buses, reduced 
routes, and long travel times hurt transit‘s public image.  When people could afford to, 
they purchased automobiles and left transit behind. 
Urban politicians showed little concern with struggling mass transportation 
companies before the early 1960s.8  The automobile served the needs of urban 
residents.  Because mass transit was primarily in the private sector, urban politicians 
rationalized that mass transit was not competitive and that the automobile and taxicabs 
could meet the urban residents‘ transportation needs.  As mass transit faded, politicians 
offered little help.  Unlike transit‘s heyday, mass transit was no long a political winner 
and therefore garnered little political attention.9  Local politicians only noticed when their 
                                                          
7
 Transportation Research Board, Glossary of Urban Public Transportation Terms, Special Report 
179 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), 15. 
8
 There are some exceptions.  Mayors in metropolitan areas served by commuter railroads were 
concerned with the condition of their transit service providers. 
9
 The franchise is an exception.  This time period (1945-1980) differs greatly from earlier time 
periods when city politics played a large role in the transit industry and vice versa. 
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own urban transit systems threatened bankruptcy.  Urban transit companies‘ insolvency 
forced a decision by politicians, who displayed little enthusiasm for public ownership.  
Urban politicians in major metropolitan areas with large commuting populations 
examined the transit problem closer when the companies threatened bankruptcy.  Since 
postwar American cities were in dire financial straits and states played a small role in 
urban responsibilities, urban politicians turned to the federal government for assistance. 
The federal government addressed the issue of mass transit in 1961 with small 
loans to transit companies.  This hardly rectified the issue and urban mayors lobbied for 
additional funds.  Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA) in 1964, 
providing money for capital upgrades, including public purchase, and also created a 
federal agency to oversee the dispersal of funds.  UMTA would spark a series of public 
takeovers of ailing, privately owned urban transit systems in America.  Also significant 
was the continuation of labor protections guaranteed under UMTA, specifically Section 
13c.  Any public takeover using federal monies required the continuation of existing labor 
protections under the new public corporation.  UMTA was necessary but not as 
comprehensive as many transit proponents wished.  Federal policy restricted a major 
restructuring of transit except for its funding sources.  Industrial relations needed 
significant restructuring for transit to return to profitability but labor unions had a strong 
political lobby.  The failure to restructure transit labor costs ensured continued transit 
deficits.  Federal legislators followed UMTA with the National Mass Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1974, which provided operating subsidies.  This act reflected the 
growing acceptance of urban mass transportation and its role in urban areas. 
Public ownership provided the chance to transform American urban mass transit 
into a real public service.  For some urban residents, mass transportation was and is 
their only transportation option.  Managers of privately owned transit systems answered 
to shareholders and regulators.  Dividends and taxes hurt reinvestment.  Public 
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ownership of mass transit promised myriad direct and indirect benefits: decreased 
pollution, reduced user costs, better buses, and better service.  The industry‘s ownership 
transition opened transportation debates that provided an opportunity to restructure local 
mass transit and provide a viable alternative to the automobile.  Public ownership of 
transit in post war America occurred at a critical juncture in urban transportation that 
saved an industry, and also provided economic and social benefits to urban areas.  For 
example, residents and politicians in Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Louisville felt that 
public ownership provided a vital community function. 
This thesis examines the desired and real impact of public ownership of the 
urban mass transit system in Indianapolis.  Who owned the system? How did private 
owners influence the success of public entities?  I will answer ownership questions by 
examining the role of the private holding company Midland Transportation Corporation in 
Indianapolis as well as Milwaukee and Louisville.  These three cities will provide good 
comparative case studies of postwar transit management and its influence on public 
ownership.  Why did Indianapolis residents and politicians decide to purchase their ailing 
mass transit provider? What steps were taken to prepare for the transition?  What were 
the short-term and long-term results of this public purchase of a vital urban transit 
system? 
Few histories examine how local political decision in postwar America influenced 
the current condition of mass transit.  Historians provide several hypotheses to transit‘s 
decline, focusing mainly between 1900 and 1950.  The most recent argument about 
transit‘s decline comes from David W. Jones, who argued that disinvestment occurred, 
as a result of over speculation by streetcar companies, inflation, rising labor costs and a 
fixed fare.10  Other arguments include industry undercapitalization, suburbanization and 
                                                          
10
 Jones, Mass Motorization, 45-46. 
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consumer choice.11  A popular misconception is that transit‘s decline was the result of 
automotive companies conspiring to purchase ailing traction (streetcar) companies and 
replaced the popular, but expensive, streetcars with cheaper buses.12  One of the 
purposes of this thesis is to show the importance of decisions during the transition from 
private to public ownership in the explanation for transit‘s current state. 
The originating reason behind public ownership varies by community but 
economist Peter Pashigian (1976) offered several hypotheses: regulation hypothesis, 
declining-industry hypothesis, and the externalities hypothesis.13  Regulation hypothesis 
contends that regulated industries, such as transit, reach a critical juncture when 
regulations prevent necessary cost-cutting measures and the additional losses due to 
stringent regulation ―result in government ownership.‖14 The ―more popular hypothesis is 
that urban transit is a declining industry and, under recent cost conditions, an 
unprofitable one under any combination of fares and service levels.‖15  Pashigian argues 
that the declining industry hypothesis must be accompanied by an externality. The 
externality hypothesis supposes there are social or economic justifications for public 
ownership.  For example, a city may want to provide transportation to transit captives. 
Pashigian‘s own conclusions lean towards the declining industry hypothesis, with the 
expectation that there exists a segment in every urban area that needs subsidized mass 
transit.16   
Books and articles written by non-historians suggest certain conclusions to the 
modern development of urban mass transit as an illuminating urban historical and 
                                                          
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Bradford C. Snell, American Ground Transport: A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile, 
Truck, Bus and Rail Industries (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 16-24.  
Automotive companies did purchase stock in ailing transit companies and replace their expensive 
rolling stock with buses, but the fate of the companies, and the industry, had long been sealed 
before the involvement of these automotive companies. 
13
 Pashigian, ―Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership,‖ 1240-1245. 
14
 Ibid., 1240. 
15
 Ibid., 1243. 
16
 Ibid., 1240-1245. 
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cultural phenomenon.  For instance, civil engineer Robert Howe wrote, ―Public 
Ownership of Mass Transit in Cincinnati‖ (1976).17  One explanation for Cincinnati transit 
troubles was the transit syndrome: reductions in ridership lead to increased fares which 
lead to further reductions in service in a vicious cycle destructive to transit systems 
overall.18  Howe noted that only one national news article covered Cincinnati‘s municipal 
takeover, which highlighted the invisibility of public ownership in the national media, and 
the fragility of the new system.  Howe‘s conclusion is that proper preparation led to a 
successful and smooth takeover in Cincinnati, which continued transit service with 
improved coaches and increased ridership. 
Howe‘s article introduces two important ideas concerning the transition to public 
ownership.  First, public takeovers of mass transit systems rarely made national news.  
George Smerk confirms: 
As an issue with no grassroots public support in 1961, transit had virtually 
no political appeal save for representatives of large urban areas highly 
dependent upon transit and commuter rail transportation.  In contrast with 
the push for civil rights legislation, an issue freighted with deep moral as 
well as political implications, urban mass transportation legislation 
seemed a picayune matter indeed.  Because transit was no longer the 
player in local urban life it once had been, it was not an issue to stir the 
senses.  It was not a well-understood issue and in its context or urban 
quality of life, a subject that was relatively unexamined in America at the 
time, transit as a federal activity was apt to elicit a yawn.19   
 
Taking this a step further from Howe and Smerk, city residents may not have been 
cognizant of, or care about, the transition of ownership.  Second, public ownership did 
not guarantee a permanent role for transit.  The relationship between the community and 
public transit could have been temporary.20  Transit‘s future laid in the hands of 
                                                          
17
 Most books and articles focus on Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., 
or Toronto.  These cities are major metropolitan areas with rapid transit systems, not exclusively 
bus transit.   
18
 Robert T. Howe, ―Public Ownership of Mass Transit in Cincinnati,‖ Traffic Quarterly 35, no. 1 
(Jan., 1976): 125. 
19
 Smerk, Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation, 78. 
20
 Howe, ―Mass Transit in Cincinnati,‖ 121. 
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management and the transit board, building mass transit as a necessary community 
service.  Howe‘s message is that Cincinnati residents developed a vested interest in 
mass transit, which aided management in obtaining future subsidies. 
Only a couple historians have analyzed the industry‘s transition to public 
ownership, concluding that federal policy was a failure and that the industry was a public 
service long before public ownership.21  David W. Jones, Jr. dedicates an entire chapter 
of Mass Motorization and Mass Transit (2008) to public ownership.22  Jones concludes 
that federal policy was a failure because it failed to alter existing conditions, especially 
industrial relations.  His work draws from testimony at federal hearings, with none of his 
resources coming from local engineering reports or city government records.23  This 
criticism should not condemn his findings, but instead challenged by local and regional 
evidence.  That is what my thesis, in part, will accomplish. 
 Martha Bianco approaches public ownership by tracing the entire transit history 
in Portland, Oregon, a city with an exceptionally sophisticated and economically complex 
integrated urban mass transit system.  Her doctoral dissertation (1994) concludes that 
streetcars in Portland were in danger before the advent of the automobile.24  She asserts 
that transit became a public service long before public ownership, due to stringent 
regulations, city franchises, and the political five cent fare.  Her methodologies and 
conclusions provide useful analytical tools when examining Indianapolis, but the 
uniqueness of Portland requires placing her conclusions in an appropriate context.   
 These two histories constitute the sum total of historical scholarship on public 
ownership.  My thesis addresses this neglected phenomenon and strives to set it in 
                                                          
21
 The decline of the streetcar and the cultural and social ramifications of highways are two 
popular topics. 
22
 Jones, Mass Motorization, 137-171. 
23
 Jones, Mass Motorization, 249-251.   
24
 Martha Bianco, ―Private Profit versus Public Service: Competing demands in urban 
transportation history and policy, Portland, Oregon, 1872-1970‖ (Ph.D. dissertation, History 
Department, Portland State University, 1994), 113. 
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comparative urban historical and cultural contexts.  The gap in historical analyses of 
midwestern transit systems and their political economies is especially striking and will be 
filled, in part, by my thesis work.  There are local histories by transit enthusiasts that will 
prove useful in providing background information.  Jerry Marlette‘s Indianapolis Railways 
(2002) traces Indianapolis‘ railway development from 1864 to 1954, and his work will 
prove useful in tracing the historical development of mass transit in Indianapolis.  I will 
draw on this, but add to it by analyzing Indianapolis transit from 1955 to 1975 under 
private ownership and from 1975 to 1980 under public ownership.  Marlette‘s work is the 
best comprehensive local history, utilizing archival sources.  David Miller published a 
series of articles on Indianapolis transportation between 1864 and 1991, published in an 
enthusiasts periodical, which is not peer edited.  Miller focused more on route additions 
and subtractions than Marlette.  These local histories provide invaluable background 
information necessary to understanding the precarious financial position of the private 
owners, but lack any revealing information about public ownership and the socio-political 
and socio-cultural ramifications that my study will explore in depth. 
 This study also examines private management, which faced several crises in 
postwar America.  The primary crisis was the industry‘s decline.  Faced with lower 
revenues and ridership, existing management ―developed a strong and understandable 
concern with cost cutting.‖25  Management curbed all innovation, saving money for basic 
operations.  New talent could have sparked innovation but the industry‘s decline failed to 
attract new blood.  Management‘s conservatism and reliance on internal promotion 
prevented the industry from focusing on its consumers through marketing and other 
                                                          
25
 George Smerk, ―The Management of Public Transit,‖ in Public Transportation: Planning, 
Operations, and Management, eds. George E. Gray and Lester A. Hoel (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1979), 424. 
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improvements.  Despite reeling from factors largely outside their control, management 
received little sympathy from the local community.26 
Ownership, however, has the perception of being the evil, greedy aspect of mass 
transit that everyone abhorred.  Arthur Saltzman observes: 
Heavily watered stock and other abuses led much of the public, and their 
political leaders, to mistrust the ―transit trusts.‖ Much of the lack of public 
empathy with the industry‘s problems could be traced to the commonly 
held image of the companies – that they were socially and financially 
irresponsible.  This was often true and was constantly reiterated by local 
politicians and newspapers.27 
 
Largely due to a 1974 government report, National City Lines (NCL) became the 
representation of transit ownership in the public‘s eye.  NCL began in 1920, operating a 
small fleet in Minnesota, but then expanded to own or control 29 urban mass 
transportation companies by 1939.  These acquisitions ―were financed almost entirely by 
stock shares sold to GMC and Firestone Tire and Rubber.‖28  NCL pursued a business 
model that included dismantling their streetcar systems and replacing them with General 
Motors‘ buses.  A Federal lawsuit accused NCL and its stockholders of violating antitrust 
laws.  After nearly two decades, GMC settled, and signed a consent decree limiting its 
involvement in mass transit.29  Although the lawsuit was successful, damages leveraged 
on NCL were minor. 
Bradford Snell‘s 1974 report introduced the lawsuit to a broader community and 
presented NCL as not only greedy, but the main culprit in the decline of mass transit.  
Snell‘s main argument contended that GM, through NCL, was culpable in transit‘s 
decline through the replacement of streetcars with rubber-tired buses.  Historian Scott 
                                                          
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Arthur Saltzman, ―The Decline of Transit,‖ in Public Transportation: Planning, Operations, and 
Management, eds. George E. Gray and Lester A. Hoel (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1979), 32.   
28
 Saltzman, ―The Decline of Transit,‖ 36. 
29
 Ibid., 36; Jones, Mass Motorization, 64-66.  Jones does an excellent job analyzing Snell‘s 
argument.  
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Bottles argues that the role of NCL was minimal compared to consumer choice and 
technological advantage of motorbuses.  While Bottles finds some of Snell‘s arguments 
to have merit, he notes that Snell‘s main argument is misplaced.  Equipment 
replacement occurred years before NCL.  Streetcars were too capital intensive and 
motorbuses were cheaper and flexible, providing an ample substitute to streetcars.30  In 
his analysis of Snell‘s report, Bottles reviews Snell‘s perception of transit companies:  
The real irony of Snell‘s report was that he portrayed the traction 
companies as virtuous, responsible public utilities trying to provide a 
public service on the one hand while fighting off the evil designs of the 
automobile manufactures on the other.  In reality, the situation was just 
the opposite.31 
 
Bottles‘ view of ownership as the opposite of virtuous and responsible might apply to Los 
Angeles and his argument on consumer choice is convincing.  Angelenos chose the 
automobile because their pleas for better transit service fell on the deaf ears of greedy 
transit companies.  My thesis will explore if the actions of transit management and 
ownership led to its decline and if these managers and owners fit the stereotype as 
being heartless, greedy businessmen.  Determining how they conducted business will 
assist in evaluating both why the companies failed and the condition of the companies 
upon public takeover. 
A major part of this study is evaluating the perception of ownership and 
management by the public in Indianapolis.  Midland Transportation Corporation, with 
investors in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Chicago, Illinois, held the majority of stock in the 
Indianapolis Transit Systems (ITS).  These men also owned transit facilities in Louisville, 
Kentucky and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Their efficiency tactics reduced service but 
maintained capital equipment and profits.  The fact that Midland, and the managers they 
                                                          
30
 Scott Bottles, Los Angeles and the Automobile: The Making of the Modern City (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987), 1-4. 
31
 Bottles, Los Angeles and the Automobile, 4. 
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hired, sustained transit in these large markets longer than companies in similarly-sized 
markets is a testament to their business acumen. 
 Rapid rail became a hallmark of the new federal legislation to aid cities in 
revitalizing mass transit.  Urban planners argued that rapid rail would promote better 
land use, possibly reducing urban sprawl, highway spending and increase the standard 
of living.  Rapid rail was expensive to maintain and operate and few communities could 
justify new rapid rail when recently-constructed highways provided a similar service.  A 
majority of the cities chose buses over rapid transit because of finances.  Voters valued 
the privacy of the highways over the potential long-term benefits of rapid rail.  The 
potential externalities were too unknown and unproven to encourage communities to 
return to mass transit after recently embracing large infrastructure spending for the 
automobile. 
 Cities choose to accept federal money for transit and which mode to choose, 
many choosing to maintain the status quo while others viewed public ownership and 
federal monies as an opportunity.32  Atlanta voters reevaluated their future transportation 
network during the decision to purchase the local bus system.  Planners, city officials, 
and a broad base of support from business and civic groups fueled the decision to build 
a complex integrated transportation system to make Atlanta more livable and 
economically competitive.33  Voters approved a ―53-mile network of rails, served by 39 
rail passenger stations, and supplemented by 8 miles of bus ways with 2 
stations…Estimated to cost $2.1 billion.‖34  Atlanta politicians, planners, and voters 
hoped that the new system would stabilize the central business district and encourage 
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transit-oriented development, and slow urban sprawl.35  Atlanta‘s experience provides 
the example of a metropolis capitalizing on the transition from private to public 
ownership, in an attempt to remake its urban center.   
The state‘s role in transit was important.  States regulated the private transit 
industry, provided legislation for the creation of public transit corporations, and later 
provided money to public mass transit.  For some background, Robert Krause‘s, ―State 
Policies in Transit: Public and Private‖ will be useful.  Krause explains that state 
governments were not very involved in urban needs until the mid-1960s.36  Prior to this, 
federal assistance met urban needs.  State politicians created their legislation as a 
reactionary measure to one or more local transit crises.  For instance, a city wanting to 
qualify for federal monies to purchase a struggling transit company might need state law 
to change.  For this study, the state regulatory agency is pivotal.  Transit companies 
petitioned the regulatory boards for fare and route changes.  The fare hearings take 
center stage in my thesis as venues for residents to voice their concerns and also a 
mechanism to examine local perspectives on the fight over transit. 
The decline of mass transit created a ―transit crisis‖ in postwar American cities. A 
―transit crisis‖ is typically a point in time when a community faces a decision on mass 
transit.  There are two types of transit crises.  The first type occurs when the community 
demands increased mass transit service and the private sector is unable or unwilling to 
provide the increases.  This type typically occurred in larger metropolitan areas at the 
turn of the twentieth century.  The second type of transit crisis occurred with the failure of 
the private sector.  Private owners of struggling mass transit companies looked for 
governmental assistance.  This failure necessitated a community decision.  The second 
type occurred more often than the first type and typically between the years 1920 and 
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1980.  Milwaukee, Louisville, and Indianapolis experienced the second type, and 
residents faced experienced and successful owners and managers.  The resulting public 
ownership debate revealed multiple schisms in postwar America in these three 
midwestern cities.  On the one hand, public ownership could provide mobility for transit 
captives, could potentially reduce pollution and congestion, and might result in higher 
standards of living in urban areas.  Public ownership of mass transit provided an 
opportunity for urban residents to alter their transportation choices.  Instead of a private 
company with frequent fare increases, the community could take pride in a new publicly-
subsidized transit system.  On the other hand, public ownership required subsidies, 
requiring either diverting funding from other public services or higher taxes.  In the end, 
public ownership was merely a transition, guaranteeing mass transit‘s survival, not mass 
transit‘s transformation.   
In this thesis, I will explore the impact of public ownership of ITS, the primary 
private mass transit company in Indianapolis.  I will also explore the influence of the 
decisions of private ownership, using Milwaukee, Louisville, and Indianapolis as 
comparative case studies.  The value of this comparative approach is to bring a regional 
and local perspective to the public ownership of formerly private transit companies in 
midwestern cities.  I will examine the influence of mass transit, and its survival, in 
automobile-centric cities in postwar America.  Chapter One will introduce the time period 
during public ownership, from the 1950s to the 1970s.  The purpose of the chapter is to 
put the local act of public ownership into a national context.  Chapter Two will introduce 
the private holding corporation Midland Transportation Corporation.  The chapter will 
also introduce, compare and contrast the three transit companies owned by Midland: 
Milwaukee and Suburban, Louisville Transit Company, and Indianapolis Transit 
Systems.  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the influence of ownership and 
management upon the three companies and compare the differing experience from 
15 
 
locality to locality.  Chapter Three brings public ownership to the local level, examining 
the ordeal in Indianapolis from 1973-1975, with some relevant comparisons with 
Milwaukee and Louisville.  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the variables that 
enter into a public ownership debate, any expectations behind public ownership, and any 
negative arguments brought against public ownership.  Chapter Four studies the first five 
years of public ownership in Indianapolis, with some minor comparisons between 
Milwaukee and Louisville.  The purpose of this chapter is to show the immediate results 
of public ownership.  The conclusion will summarize the evidence presented and 
analyze the significance of my findings.   
Public ownership did not occur in a historical vacuum.  Postwar America was a 
time of bunny hops, drive-ins, and the brewing of significant social changes.  It is in this 
historical context that mass transit sputtered and nearly ended.   
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Chapter One: 
 
The Decline of Privately Owned Mass Transit 
 
 
The Watts Riots, as they are commonly known, were a product of deep racial 
tensions in the Los Angeles community, awaiting a trigger.  On 11 August 1965, a 
routine traffic stop for suspected drunk driving resulted in an altercation between the two 
white policemen, the African-American driver, and the driver‘s mother.  This altercation 
unleashed a sequence of riots that when finished left 34 people dead, over 1,000 
injured, and almost 4,000 arrested.  Following the riots, the governor of California, 
Edmund Brown, Sr., appointed a commission to investigate.  This commission, also 
known as the McCone Commission, concluded that the seclusion of the Watts area was 
one catalyst, fueled in part by inadequate mass transportation:  
Our investigation has brought into clear focus the fact that the inadequate 
and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los 
Angeles area seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged areas 
such as south central Los Angeles.  This lack of adequate transportation 
handicaps them in seeking and holding jobs, attending schools, shopping, 
and fulfilling other needs.  It has had a major influence in creating a sense 
of isolation, with its resultant frustrations, among the residents of south 
central Los Angeles, particularly the Watts area.1 
 
The fare increases and service cuts like those in Watts were endemic in other urban 
areas.  Nationally, suburban development and increased automobile usage reduced 
both the center city and transit ridership.  In turn, transit companies cut both operating 
and capital expenditures, reducing the size and quality of mass transit in American cities. 
The McCone Commission suggested the city ―purchase or condemn the multiple 
uncoordinated bus systems‖ as one remedy to the seclusion in Watts.2  Coordination 
through public ownership made sense.  Servicing suburban developments was either 
unprofitable or, in some areas, illegal.  Uncoordinated transfers between private urban 
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and suburban carriers created cumbersome and time-consuming trips.3  Public purchase 
of all systems serving Los Angeles could improve urban mobility by creating a 
coordinated system of mass transit.  Proponents of public ownership hoped increased 
mobility would allow trapped urban residents access to suburban jobs and necessary 
services. 
The significance of the McCone Commission‘s report is its national visibility due 
to the riots.  As a solution to mobility and urban issues, ―local public officials were fairly 
indifferent to mass transportation…Transit was given a backseat.‖4  Media attention was 
negative, highlighting fare increase and service cuts.  Few media outlets or civic leaders 
connected declining mass transit with growing urban isolation and poverty.  The McCone 
Commission placed mass transit on a national stage and highlighted the benefits of 
public ownership to an urban area.  The report also was a grave reminder of the 
consequences of urban isolation and inaccessibility. 
The McCone Commission had its detractors.  Not everyone agreed that a link 
existed between inadequate transportation and employment.  Joseph Mooney, an 
economist, studied metropolitan decentralization and found that ―the separation of inner 
city Negro females from growing job centers in the suburbs had an almost negligible 
effect on their employment opportunities.‖5  Another critic concluded that job access for 
urban residents was a result of the lack of suburban housing opportunities and not 
transportation.6  Historian Robert Fogelson challenged the commission‘s objectivity, its 
                                                          
3
 There are numerous studies of this topic.  See Christopher Davies, ―Reverse Commuter 
Problem in Indianapolis‖ (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, Indiana University 
Bloomington, 1970), 90-99; Jay Carlisle, ―Some Practical Studies in Public Transportation,‖ in A 
Report of the 1966 Conference on Mass Transportation (New York: Popular Library, 1967), 111.   
4
 Smerk, Federal Role in Urban Mass Transportation, 52-53. 
5
 Joseph D. Mooney, ―Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan 
Decentralization:  An Alternative Perspective,‖ Quarterly Journal of Economics 83, no. 2 (May, 
1969): 309. 
6
 Gilbert Paul Verbit, ―The Urban Transportation Problem,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 124, no. 2 (Dec., 1975): 378-384.  His argument here is less cited than in other areas, 
18 
 
short turnaround time, its preconceived notions of Watts, and its fact checking.  For 
example, Fogelson claimed that the percentage of car owners in Watts, cited by the 
commission at 14 percent, was actually 65 percent.7  These claims against the McCone 
Commission were justified but do not detract from the visibility gained by public 
ownership as a result of its report.  
Public ownership of mass transit in Indianapolis did not exist in a historical 
vacuum and local efforts to acquire transit companies were (and must be) appreciated in 
the national context of such acquisitions.8  By asking certain research questions, I can 
more appropriately place public ownership in its historical and national context.  What 
are the historical beginnings of public ownership of mass transit? What was the historical 
context in which public takeovers occurred? 
National Historical Development of Public Ownership of Mass Transit 
The idea of public ownership was not novel when the McCone Commission 
suggested it in 1965.  Glenn Yago notes: ―Between 1898 and 1920, virtually every major 
U.S. city was the scene of legal battles, referenda over rate hikes, public ownership 
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campaigns, and investigations of transit corruption.‖9  A brief historical overview of the 
decline of mass transit is necessary to understand early public ownership campaigns. 
The period between 1890 and 1920 witnessed the excitement of widespread 
electrification and then the industry‘s struggle to maintain its competitiveness.  Investors 
lacked confidence because of early profiteering, local governments enacted regulatory 
revenge for perceived excess profits and operating costs increased as a result of an 
inflationary economy and heavily leveraged traction companies.10  Executives operating 
in good faith struggled to attract adequate capital to repair their rolling stock, further 
eroding rider confidence.  Federally mandated wage increases during World War One 
and the advent of the automobile exacerbated the industry‘s decline.11  Mass transit‘s 
centrality to urban living was slipping, evidenced by the fact that ―by 1919 one-third of 
the operating companies were bankrupt.‖12  The once thriving mass transit industry was 
struggling and the industry needed to find a solution. 
President Woodrow Wilson appointed a federal commission in 1919 to review the 
electric railway problem.  Delos Wilcox, a well-respected utility and transportation expert, 
was chosen to analyze the proceedings and present his findings.13  Among his 
conclusions was that public ownership might be the ultimate solution to the industry‘s 
problems.  Wilcox noted:  
I have reached the conclusion that there is no ultimate solution of the 
problem unless we frankly undertake the local transportation function as a 
public function and perform it through public agencies.  Local 
transportation, in the first place, as I have said, is essentially a part of the 
city plan.  It is a public function.  The street railways cannot exist except 
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through the possession and use of special franchises in the public streets.  
Convenient and cheap transit has come to be an essential for the public 
convenience in large urban communities.14 
 
Wilcox‘s conclusion reinforced the concept of transit as a public service, better 
conducted by public agencies.  Wilcox‘s position came from careful analysis of testimony 
in front of the commission, collected in one chapter, ―The Pros and Cons of Public 
Ownership.‖  Proponents pointed to efficiencies as a result of lower public financing 
costs, social benefits, and economic necessity.15  Opponents cited the possible 
inefficiencies of public involvement and political interference.16  The most influential 
speaker was former President William Taft, who said early in the hearings, ―I am 
personally against government ownership, for the reason that I think it reduces the 
economy of operation, and therefore greatly increases the cost of something that is 
essential to the people.‖17  Taft‘s position was significant not only because he was a past 
president but also because he was one of the commission‘s first speakers.  Other critics 
agreed with Taft and thought the industry attractive enough for private investment.18  
Taft‘s remarks, the potential of private investment, and the contemporary political view 
towards an idea that was ―unmitigated evil, and forerunner of Socialism, Bolshevism and 
various other evil things that may happen‖ are all good explanations for why public 
ownership of mass transit was not widespread in the United States until after World War 
II.19  There were exceptions.  Early public ownership typically occurred in larger 
metropolitan areas with a large population of transit riders, like New York City and 
Boston.  These major cities were exceptions and without a major economic catastrophe 
or private failing, the debate on public ownership would dissipate.   
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By the time of the 1919 commission, mass transit had acquired a poor public 
image.20  Overcrowded streetcars became the norm on transit lines as companies 
sought to maximize profits by using fewer cars.21  Dense downtown areas combined with 
large streetcars often led to harrowing accidents involving serious injuries and deaths, 
often highly publicized.  Streetcar owners were known to use their companies to 
increase the value of their real estate holdings.  For example, Bottles noted that Los 
Angeles streetcar baron Henry Huntington would extend railway lines to his own real 
estate holdings, thereby increasing the property values and creating a tidy profit.22  It 
appeared that mass transit companies were far more interested in making money than 
providing a safe, reliable form of transportation.  Curtailed service and cramped cars, 
combined with cheaper automobiles and government-built roads, convinced urban 
residents to purchase automobiles for their work commuter and entertainment and 
abandon streetcars run by greedy owners.23   
The reason for inequity in public investment in urban transportation lies in the 
public‘s perception.  People viewed the road as a public good and the streetcar as a 
private good.24  Private pressure groups, including merchants, pushed for public 
financing of streets to reduce traffic congestion that depressed real estate values.  
Roadway improvements could become self-sustaining because of the property taxes 
they generated.25  This discrepancy between transit as a private good and roads as a 
public one proved important when the industry declined and looked towards public 
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ownership as a solution.  While public road agencies obtained funds, private mass 
transit companies relied on the well of private investors, which was slowly drying up. 
 Federal antitrust legislation impaired mass transit further.  Large holding 
corporations invested in transit in the 1920s, while retaining stock in other utilities.  
Management expertise and capital from these large holding corporations maintained 
transit‘s level of service, even as transit revenues declined.26  Holding corporations 
directly controlled 10 percent of the total of revenue passengers in 1931, and some 
dozen trusts indirectly controlled another 171 transit companies.27  The federal 
government passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, requiring each 
holding company to limit itself to one public utility.  Holding companies happily severed 
the money-losing operations.  The separation dealt a dual blow to transit, as the industry 
lost access to managerial talent and capital.28  
The Great Depression pushed more transit companies into bankruptcy.  In 1939, 
the topic of public versus private operation reappeared.  An early article on the merit of 
public ownership got directly to the heart of the debate:  
The objective of a change from private ownership to public ownership 
should be better conditions.  The question is entirely a practical one: Will 
public ownership produce better service, lower costs on which fares are 
based, better facilities, or better management, than do private ownership 
and operation?29 
 
The authors, Thomas Fitzgerald and C.D. Palmer, disagreed that public ownership was 
the solution, pointing towards the inefficiencies that political pressure would create.  ―It is 
only natural that the political objectives to be satisfied will frequently outweigh the 
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economic.‖30  They cautioned that organized labor might abuse their political capital, 
through unrealistic wage increases.  The authors concluded that, ―It is not contended 
that private ownership and operation are ideal.  It is contended that private ownership 
permits better economic adjustments, upon which the success of any enterprise rests, 
than does public ownership.‖31  Probably the best reflection of this opinion was that while 
transit struggled, there were only a handful of publicly owned transit companies in the 
United States.32   
A short six years later, and another commentator would hint towards the opposite 
conclusion, ―The practices vary widely, but the trend seems to be toward public 
ownership and operation, particularly in large cities.‖33 Henry Mayer‘s prediction might 
seem puzzling considering that the more than 18 billion revenue passengers carried on 
all forms of transit in 1945 was the highest recorded.34  The ridership number was an 
aberration because of wartime rationing on rubber, gas, and automobile production.  The 
unexpected wartime income helped struggling transit companies, but the wartime 
demands stretched existing equipment and postwar federal taxes depleted reserves 
gained during wartime.  The postwar years meant costly capital upgrades and expansion 
for survival.  For some companies, it meant the real threat of bankruptcy.   
Even as mass transit expanded between 1890 and 1920, the expansion, 
government regulations, and poor ownership decisions contributed to the early 
campaigns for public ownership in the United States.  Transit‘s perception as a private 
good and continued private profit squashed campaigns in nearly every city.  Transit‘s 
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troubles continued with the widespread adoption of the automobile and proliferation of 
suburbs.   
Center City Decline and the Automobile 
The ownership transition (1945-1980) occurred during unique circumstances in 
American history, when the urban areas themselves were undergoing a transformation. 
David Jones, Jr. summed it up best: 
Transit‘s conversion to public ownership occurred in the context of 
profound changes in the growth trends, spatial arrangements, racial 
composition, and economic prospect of American cities.  In many of the 
nation‘s most populous and most transit-oriented cities, these changes 
included decline in the central city‘s white population, rapid growth of the 
central city‘s black population, quickening growth of suburban population 
and employment, a weakening of downtown‘s employment base, and 
increasing dilapidation and blight—both in the shadows of downtown and 
in lower-income neighborhoods.  These trends accelerated white flight, 
alarmed urban mayors, and mobilized downtown support for urban 
redevelopment and federal investment in both rapid transit and urban 
renewal.35 
 
A metropolitan revolution was taking place.36  These new suburban areas included not 
just shopping malls but businesses as well.37  The factories followed the commercial and 
residential suburban move, taking their jobs and taxes.   
Federal legislation encouraged postwar suburban development.  Federally 
insured housing programs aided the development of detached, single family homes.38  
These new suburban developments allowed urban residents to leave the distressed 
urban environment and fulfill their dream of homeownership with government backed 
mortgages.  Access to these suburban developments increased with the 1956 Federal 
Aid Highway Act, which created the Interstate Highway System, a system originally 
consisting of 41,000 miles of limited access highways.  The resulting system fueled low 
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density development and sprawl.39  Although the intent may have been different, federal 
legislation fueled the abandonment of the center cities and suburban sprawl. 
The ―March to the suburbs necessitate[d] mass transportation to and from the 
center cities.‖40  ―Mass transportation‖ in this sense includes automobiles, a notable 
exception to the established definition.  The personal affordability and popularity of the 
automobile made limited access highways the easy transportation choice for city 
leaders.  Early in postwar America, urban geographer Harold Mayer raised concerns 
about future urban center and automobile land use:  
The congestion would stifle the city and force dispersion of many of its 
functions.  Indeed, that is already happening, and many outlying industrial 
and commercial districts owe their growth to congestion and lack of 
parking facilities in the central city.  Mass public transit is part of the 
solution to the congestion problem.41   
 
Mayer identified two major problems with contemporary urban transportation systems: 
automobile congestion and automobile land use, including storage of automobiles.  
Without an increased presence of transit, the central city would deteriorate physically 
and in significance, replaced by suburban centers.42   
Automobile use soared in postwar America.  By 1956, the United States had 384 
vehicles per 1,000 populations and Jones commented that, ―By 1950 it [owning a car] 
had become ‗essential.‘‖43  The American populace had fully embraced the automobile, 
in part because of postwar affluence and automotive reliability.  The automobile provided 
the privacy and comfort expected by Americans, without battling weather conditions 
waiting for a bus.  There were no more fights for neither seats nor the often vain hope 
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during the summer that the bus pulling up had a working air conditioner or, in the winter, 
a functioning heater.44  The benefits of the automobile trumped the financial savings of 
transit systems and threatened the life of downtown cities across America.   
Nearly twenty years later, Robert B. Mitchell, an urban planner, confirmed 
Mayer‘s predictions.  Older downtown buildings, including businesses, lacked adequate 
automobile storage for patrons and employees.  Congestion had become a major 
problem, even with city planning and major infrastructure expenses to expand streets 
and build highways.45  Mitchell‘s solution was comprehensive planning, which became 
popular in urban planning circles in the 1950s.  One of the basic principles of 
comprehensive planning was the idea that ―highway and transit systems must be 
planned together.‖46  Prior to the 1950s, public planners saw little reason to incorporate 
privately owned transit into municipal plans, as public officials assumed transit could 
adapt to the city plans, not vice versa.47  Even with comprehensive planning and 
balanced transportation, few cities gave serious thought to transit planning.  This 
unfortunate oversight would continue the sprawl that characterized cities for decades 
and would make arguments for transit difficult in light of the geographic dispersal of 
cities. 
Urban Americans in the mid-1960s started to question the real costs of the 
automobile.48  Part of this inquiry came from an increased environmental consciousness.  
Philip Scarpino noted: ―In the 1960s popularization of ecology, a growing concern over 
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environmental degradation, and an expanding interest in preserving and enhancing 
environmental quality stimulated the emergence of a broad-based environmental 
movement.‖49  Part of the environmental movement focused on the destruction caused 
by the automobile, including the construction of the Interstate Highway System.  The 
Interstate Highway System, specifically urban highways, became the antagonist in books 
such as Superhighway, Superhoax (1970) and Highways to Nowhere (1972).  
Superhighway was really a treatise against urban highways while Highways to Nowhere 
examined the impact of automobiles on a select number of smaller metropolises, like 
Indianapolis.  The urban highway portion of the Federal-Aid Highway Act created tension 
when urban residents witnessed the ―dreams‖ of politicians, highway planners, and 
engineers as bulldozers swallowed entire neighborhoods and replaced the vibrant 
communities with concrete ribbons.  By the early and mid-1960s, urban residents 
actively protested the construction of these expensive thoroughfares.  As construction 
continued through the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, newer projects encountered 
stiffer opposition and in some instances, grassroots campaigns were successful in 
stopping projects.50  The OPEC Oil Embargo of 1973 raised additional awareness about 
America‘s dependency on foreign oil, pushed Congress to introduce transit operating 
subsidies, and triggered attention for fuel-efficient imports.51   
While limited access highways provided a quicker downtown commute, 
municipalities struggled to build or repair crowded urban streets.  For example, the 
surface streets linking to the Interstate System were a sizable expenditure for 
Indianapolis.52  The city and county paid more for local thoroughfares than the state 
contributed for its 10 percent commitment to the Interstate System within the city.  
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Indianapolis, and other cities like it, invested in infrastructure for the automobile, which 
served a majority of urban and suburban residents.  There was little money left over, 
locally and at the federal level, for transit.53  
The group impacted most by both the decline of the center city and transit was 
transit captives.  The departure of department stores, entertainment venues, and jobs 
from central cities left few options for those unable to afford an automobile and still living 
in urban settings.  The shift especially hurt low-income groups, whose skill set matched 
the demands of suburban factories, not the demands of the growing downtown financial 
and government sectors.  The suburban factories needed workers with access to 
transportation and transit services to these areas was poor.54  Zimmerman pleaded that 
action needed to occur to prevent the ―quarter of the population most dependent upon 
public transportation and least able to pay higher fares—children, the handicapped, the 
unemployed, the underemployed and senior citizens‖ from being unable to access 
transportation.55  Many others within the transit industry and government shared 
Zimmerman‘s concern for the underprivileged, which are ―at the fringes of the total 
population.‖56  Public ownership provided the opportunity for governments to expand 
service and provide job access to those who needed it the most. 
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End of the Line 
Private owners faced significant obstacles to postwar profitability.  The 
widespread adoption of the automobile, suburban living, television, and the shorter 
workweek decreased the number of transit riders.57  Residents no longer needed 
streetcars for economic or cultural access and urban mayors clamored for federal 
subsidies.  Transit companies continued to struggle, with some abandoning service, 
leaving communities without any transit service.  Bankruptcy forced the government to 
evaluate the need for transit and whether saving transit service with subsidies would be 
prudent. 
Nationally, transit ridership declined while costs climbed from 1945 to 1970.  
Focusing on just a ten year period from 1945 to 1955, the industry‘s problems can be 
analyzed.58  Annual ridership in 1945 totaled 23,245,000.  In 1955, ridership totaled only 
11,529,000, a loss of more than 50 percent.59  Private owners cut routes, delayed 
maintenance, and delayed capital upgrades to remain solvent.  Contemporaneously, two 
important categories changed dramatically: operating income and operating expense 
ratio, which is operating expenses divided by operating revenues.60  A good operating 
expense ratio meant money for reinvestment and dividends; a healthy number was 
considered fewer than 90.  In 1945, the operating income shrank from $148,730,000 in 
1945 to $55,710,000 in 1955.  In that same period, the operating expenses ratio 
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ballooned from 77.31 to 89.55.61  Operating income as a percent of operating revenue 
went from 10.77 to 3.91, leaving little for reinvestment and dividends.62  Average annual 
earnings per employee climbed from $2,612 to $4,364, representative of organized 
labor‘s strength in transit.63  The dismal outlook of urban transit companies prompted 
riders and transit companies to look for governmental assistance.   
Few states financially supported mass transit.  ―The Role of the States in Mass 
Transit‖ (1971) explained that, ―until now less than a handful of states have shown an 
interest in assisting their cities and urban regions to meet their capital expenditures 
needs in urban mass transit‖ and only two states (New York and Pennsylvania) funded 
operating expenses.64  Aside from states with large metropolitan areas and a strong 
history of transit ridership, most states (and localities) provided no direct financial 
support, partly because of the long history in the private sector and partly because of a 
lack of political capital.  The hesitancy or outright refusal of states to fund mass transit 
meant that urban areas relied on revenue bonds or taxes to support (or purchase) ailing 
transit systems.65  With the fiscal instability of municipalities in postwar America, money 
for mass transit‘s survival was sparse, at all levels of government.  For many 
communities, financial support was not an option and transit service ceased permanently 
or until another private owner stepped in. 
With states ignoring the problems of transit companies, desperate urban leaders 
turned to the federal government for aid.66  The federal government turned its attention 
towards mass transit with the passage of the Federal Housing Act (1961), which 
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included funds for transit demonstration projects and loans.  Demonstration projects 
included free fare, half-fare, and express routes and proved useful in evaluating the 
potential success of these projects.  While some successful demonstration projects 
encouraged transit ridership, the Federal Housing Act of 1961 did not ―do much to help 
the sagging fortunes of urban commuter railways or mass transit systems.‖67  The 
Federal Housing Act was temporary but the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA) of 
1964 was more permanent, providing capital grants and extending demonstration 
projects.  Smerk noted three broad goals of UMTA: ―(1) to preserve and enhance urban 
values; (2) to serve the population at the lowest cost and (3) to help shape cities.‖68  
―Shape‖ meant creating higher population density areas through transit-oriented 
development.  Given that buses were the overwhelmingly vehicle for the industry, this 
idea had a limited impact.  Only cities like Atlanta and Denver, that committed to light 
rail, witnessed an urban landscape transformation through transit-oriented development.  
UMTA also created a national mass transit agency, the Urban Mass Transportation 
Administration, that approved and distributed UMTA funds and enforced federal 
regulations.69  UMTA signaled an opportunity to revitalize mass transit in the United 
States, saving transportation for transit captives and jobs for thousands of transit 
workers. 
UMTA included an important labor protection clause called Section 13c.  This 
section continued bargaining rights negotiated under private ownership, provided wage 
security, and allowed for personnel retraining.  The heavily unionized transit industry 
wished to protect these bargaining rights, won after years of exploitation by owners 
during the early days of streetcars, with a transition from the private sector to the public.  
The protection clause provided organized labor with significant leverage, as UMTA only 
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disbursed federal funds with a signed 13c agreement.  As Smerk remarked, Section 13c 
fueled debate because ―transit management typically views 13c as a club over its head; 
labor sees it as protection.‖ 70  Critics viewed 13c as detrimental to transforming transit 
because it protected high labor costs and restrictive work rules.  Others, including 
organized labor, felt Section 13c was necessary and beneficial, allowing adequate 
compensation for transit workers.  Section 13c did both to some degree, but its 
significance is the preservation of organized labor‘s power in transit.  Maintaining labor‘s 
power in transit solidified good wages but maintained the status quo, which would 
necessitate either efficiencies or a greater subsidy. 
Higher labor costs and declining revenues in postwar America further pinched 
transit companies, especially those in smaller communities.  ―Between 1954 and 1963, 
194 transit companies went out of business.  The typical medium-sized community in the 
country was simply left without a transit system.‖71  In Indiana alone, companies 
abandoned operations in Columbus, Elkhart, Jeffersonville, Peru, Wabash, and 
Washington.  With the exception of Columbus, these were small communities, with 
populations averaging 12,000.72  Small or large communities could refuse to subsidize 
failing private companies, leaving transit captives with no alternative but expensive 
taxicabs or rides from friends. 
A demonstration project in Watts concluded transit service as unprofitable but a 
―vital community function,‖ allowing urban residents to access suburban jobs and 
necessary services.73  Watts represented the stereotypical urban neighborhood, with 
poor, unskilled workers lacking access to necessary services and suburban jobs.  The 
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report on the demonstration project was another example in the ideological shift in 
combating urban poverty and isolation through social programs.  Transportation experts 
highlighted the Watts area as an example of transit‘s necessity in the community. 
This attitude shift from the early twentieth century can be seen in the number of 
municipalized companies.  Private ownership by the 1960s abandoned all hope of 
continuing operations.  Glenn Yago noted, ―By the early sixties, urban mass transit faced 
extinction in the United States.  More than 90 percent of the country‘s transit systems 
were municipalized in a last-ditch effort to absorb growing deficits and maintain 
service.‖74  Properties in Louisville, Indianapolis, and Milwaukee remained in private 
ownership longer than in most metropolitan areas and remained as examples of private 
ownership‘s viability.  The efficiencies enacted in these communities reveal disgruntled 
riders, anxious politicians and weary managers.  All three recognized the inevitability of 
public ownership. 
In 1921, Delos Wilcox squarely placed the responsibility of transportation 
preservation on the local community.75  National events reflected the local trends as 
much as they influenced them.  How the local actors responded to their own pressures 
and national influences determined the success (or failure) of the revitalization of mass 
transit.  The important question asked during public ownership discussions was: Would 
urban residents use public ownership to transform transit or continue the status quo? 
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Chapter Two 
 
Struggling To Survive: Private Ownership in Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Louisville  
 
―You know, somebody can buy a hotel and, pay nothing down and 
make a big success out of it and he‘s a hero, but if you buy a transit 
system, you are a bum.‖1 
-- Henry Mayer, General Manager of 
Milwaukee and Suburban Transport 
Co. (1974) 
 
David W. Jones explored the topic of public ownership in his book, Mass 
Motorization and Mass Transit (2008).  He blamed transit‘s decline on the industry‘s 
early twentieth century credit woes, postwar central city population decline, and 
increased affluence.2  Increased affluence translated into additional Americans affording 
a first and second automobile, plus a suburban home.3  Jones concludes that: ―transit‘s 
ridership and work-trip market share have been diminished by economic forces and 
population dynamics well beyond transit‘s control.‖4  Management and ownership, 
argued Jones, were not the primary factors in transit‘s decline. 
Jones‘ national analysis ignored community perceptions and expectations.  The 
communities of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Louisville, Kentucky 
placed the blame for transit‘s decline on management and outside ownership.  Efficiency 
cuts at companies in these communities reduced service but maintained profits and 
dividends.  Declining ridership and rising inflation required companies to request fare 
increases to remain solvent.  The public opposed the fare increases, citing continued 
dividend payments as a valid reason for denying the company requests.  These 
communities perceived that companies simply wanted to maximize profits, with little 
regard of their efficiency decisions on the local community.  Management argued that 
their situation was complex and out of their control; fare increases and service cuts 
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meant survival.  Politicians, especially local ones, avoided the transit crisis until severe 
problems developed, a result of a dominant automobile culture and minimal local transit 
lobby. 
The tension between transit‘s nature as a private business and the community‘s 
perception of transit as a social service became clearer as captive riders became the 
primary riders.  Riders blamed ownership and management for the local company‘s 
failure; management and ownership tried to operate an ethical business but could only 
reduce service and raise fares to remain solvent.  Transit‘s perception as an essential 
public service did not override the dread politicians of automobile-oriented cities 
harbored for the unknown financial obligations of public ownership.  The period from 
recognizing transit service‘s termination until public ownership began was the period in 
which politicians tried to become comfortable with the idea of public ownership.  This 
delay allowed choice riders the time to find alternatives to the current system.  
Examining the relationships between ownership, management, riders, and local 
politicians in postwar Milwaukee, Louisville, and Indianapolis will provide perspective into 
the influence of ownership and management on postwar American mass transit and its 
transition into public ownership. 
Historical Development of Milwaukee, Louisville, and Indianapolis 
These three cities are midwestern metropolises.  Milwaukee is the most northern 
and Louisville the most southern, with Indianapolis couched between them.  Located just 
off Lake Michigan, Milwaukee benefits from close proximity to Chicago and its economic 
prosperity.  Indianapolis is centrally located in Indiana, which heralds itself as ―The 
Crossroads of America.‖  Louisville is the river city, benefitting from traffic on the Ohio 
River.  All three had strong ties to manufacturing and transportation services.  Table 1 
shows the population distribution of the three metropolises.   
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 1950 1960 1970 
Indianapolis 551,777 697,567 1,109,882 
Louisville 576,900 725,139 826,553 
Milwaukee 871,047 1,194,290 1,403,688 
Table 1.  Population Statistics for Indianapolis, Louisville, and Milwaukee, 1950-
1970.  The population statistics for Indianapolis, Indiana; Louisville, Kentucky; 
and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
5
 
The city‘s importance in transit trumped state involvement, but the state played 
three important roles: regulation, providing transit legislation and subsidies.  Wisconsin, 
Kentucky and Indiana passed laws regulating mass transit, typically with politically-
appointed regulation boards enforcing the regulations.  Wisconsin and Indiana 
established politically appointed regulation boards while Kentucky employed a single 
commissioner in a hearing.  The three regulatory bodies were the Indiana Public Service 
Commission (IPSC), the Wisconsin Public Service Commission (WPSC), and the 
Kentucky Department of Motor Vehicles (KDMV).  These state agencies regulated fare 
and route changes.6  Regulatory bodies rarely questioned fare increases and only when 
stringent public opposition occurred.7  Critics viewed the state regulatory agencies as 
understaffed and business friendly.8  These boards provided one of the few venues for 
communities to oppose fare hikes. 
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Enabling state legislation was central to creating public corporations communities 
required and providing subsidies to those new public corporations.  Legislation in many 
states was reactionary to the transit crisis and communities needed the enabling 
legislation to create the corporation best suited to meet their future transportation needs.  
Milwaukee politicians determined county purchase and operation as the best choice, but 
no state legislation authorized county purchase or operation.  Wisconsin passed such 
enabling legislation but legislative hurdles slowed down public purchase, allowing the 
further deterioration of private transit systems.9  Legislation in Kentucky and Indiana 
mirrored legislation in Wisconsin.  Few states were proactive in solving the transit crisis. 
The cities remain central when considering public purchase and operation.  All 
three cities have a rich transportation and manufacturing history.  A traditional port city, 
Milwaukee grew through manufacturing, brewing, and socialism.  The city ―prospered 
first as a classic port city, a point of exchange between farm products headed east and 
finished goods coming west.  It became a haven for immigrants, particularly Germans 
and Poles, whose muscle and ambition fueled an industrial revolution.‖10 The prevalence 
of middle-class factory workers, combined with harsh winter conditions, provided a 
transit-friendly environment.  Louisville developed with Irish and Scottish influence along 
the Ohio River as an industrial city, influenced by the development of the railroad, and 
heavily influenced by the railroads development, which provided a spur to the local and 
regional economy.11  Indianapolis developed itself through transportation.  Initially settled 
as a midpoint in the state for bureaucratic ease, it was also located on the White River 
for transportation reasons.  The White River proved unsuitable for river travel and until 
―the Central Canal (1836), the completion of the National Road to Indianapolis (1838), 
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and the arrival of the first railroad (1847),‖ Indianapolis grew slowly.12  Indianapolis‘ 
growth came at the turn of the twentieth century, spurred by railroad traffic and as a 
center for automobile production.  The three cities had a similar development, excepting 
the geographical differences of Milwaukee and Louisville, and Milwaukee‘s penchant for 
socialism.  The similarities allowed private owners to develop a standard managerial 
approach but the differences influenced future mass transit development, options and 
quality of service. 
All three invested heavily in urban highways to accommodate suburban residents 
and growing automobile demands and few city officials considered mass transit 
plausible.  A Milwaukee infrastructure insider noted, ―In the late 1950s and most of the 
1960s, freeway construction was very popular…When elected officials and county 
officials spoke to the commission of freeways, it was to demand faster construction.‖13  
Milwaukee‘s experience was not unique, as Indianapolis‘ fascination with freeways 
became a chapter in Highways to Nowhere, a book about the impact of the automobile 
culture on urban areas.  Author Richard Hebert criticized Indianapolis politicians for 
investing too heavily in freeways.  The dismissive tone of certain government officials 
towards mass transit especially outraged Hebert.  IDOT head Richard Wetzel dismissed 
public transit recommendations in a regional transportation study as a ―‘whore‘s 
dream.‘‖14  Wetzel considered transit upgrades foolish for Indianapolis, especially 
considering the decline of private transit in the city.  Hebert made a note on highway 
builders: ―they build white men‘s highways through black men‘s homes.‖15  These new 
urban highways decreased commuting time for suburban residents and were an 
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incentive for automobile commuting.  Heavy highway investment meant cities committed 
precious taxpayer dollars to highways.   
Urban residents utilized urban highways to escape from blighted urban areas, 
which weakened city finances.16  In Milwaukee, the county looked new, but the city 
looked decrepit.17  Problems collecting tax monies fueled annexation campaigns in 
Louisville and Milwaukee.  Many areas around Milwaukee succeeded in avoiding 
annexation, creating a hodge-podge of municipal lines and political rifts.  Louisville had 
more success, but a fair number of areas around Louisville incorporated to avoid 
annexation and higher taxes.18  Annexation failed to solve Louisville‘s financial issues, 
forcing politicians to pass an occupational license tax.19  The new tax allowed Louisville 
to expand public welfare and repair infrastructure, substituting for financial losses due to 
suburbanization.20  Milwaukee‘s frugality and smart financial moves allowed the city to 
reinvest in new downtown new cultural attractions, which ―signified a community looking 
to the future with unbounded confidence.‖21  The urban renewal projects had little 
community involvement and little impact.22  Much like Milwaukee, Indianapolis engaged 
in an aggressive downtown rebuilding project, constructing new commercial buildings, 
retail space, and redeveloping blight areas. 
Between 1950 and 1980, separate city and county governments existed in 
Milwaukee and Louisville.  The jurisdictional tension was palpable in Milwaukee, much 
greater than Louisville.  Indianapolis unified its city and county governments in 1970, 
with only a few incorporated cities as exceptions.  Indianapolis and Louisville had 
traditionally conservative political temperament.  Milwaukee had a strong socialist 
                                                          
16
 Kleber, Encyclopedia of Louisville, xxvii. 
17
 Gurda, Making of Milwaukee, 343-346. 
18
 Kleber, Encyclopedia of Louisville, xxviii. 
19
 Ibid., xxix. 
20
 Ibid., xxviii. 
21
 Ibid., 346-355. 
22
 Ibid., 366-367. 
40 
 
tradition, with a populace that encouraged welfare spending.  These political tensions 
figure prominently in public purchase and ownership, as any delays weakened already 
weak transit companies. 
Transit‘s anemic response to postwar American affluence was a result of minimal 
private investment and declining revenues, necessitating operational efficiencies. 
Nationally, transit companies curbed capital purchases while decreasing service to 
reduce operational costs.  From 1950 to 1970, the pinnacle of purchasing was in 1966, 
when the 1,000 company industry acquired 3,100 new buses.23 These efficiencies 
perpetuated the cycle of transit ridership decline.  As a result of these company actions, 
the community‘s perception of transit continued to recede and flocked to the automobile.  
Enter Frederick Johnson and Midland Transportation Corporation 
The three transit companies shared five common investors, two from Chicago 
and three from Milwaukee.  Arthur Kuesel was President of the Kuesel Coal Company in 
Milwaukee.  William C. Coleman was a Milwaukee coal executive.  E.P. Thorsen was a 
Milwaukee businessman.  The two Chicagoans were lawyers, J. Roy Browning and 
Edward P. Madigan. Frederick Johnson was a late addition to the investor group and a 
veteran transit executive.  These investors organized the Milwaukee and Suburban 
Transport Corporation (Transport Co.) and acquired the Milwaukee Electric Railway and 
Traction Corporation from Wisconsin Electric Power in 1952 with $500,000 as a down 
payment, $4 million in bonds, and $6 million in promissory notes.24  For greater 
efficiency, the investors created three subsidiaries.  The first was the Mid-Empire 
Corporation, which purchased fuel and automotive supplies for Transport Co.  Another, 
Transport-Ads, leased advertising space on company buses, replacing a contracted 
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firm.25  Lastly, they opened Midland Industries, which maintained heavy-duty trucks and 
functioned as a salvage operation, liquidating Transport Co.‘s extraneous equipment 
after modernization, including overhead wires and irrelevant real estate.26  These 
efficiencies indicated businessmen capable of producing substantial dividends.   
The investors acknowledged the need to trim costs at the Transport Co. to 
maximize profits.  The Transport Co. was a model mass transit system, but it employed 
a significant number of personnel unneeded for the company‘s basic operation.  After 
the first general manager proved unwilling to enact ownership‘s desired changes, the 
owners brought in Frederick Johnson, also known as ―Fritz,‖ in 1953.  Born in Norfolk, 
Nebraska, he held a Master‘s degree in electrical engineering from the University of 
Colorado in Boulder.27  Prior to the Transport Co., he was president of Louisville 
Railways Company and a well-respected transit executive.  His industry peers 
recognized his talent by electing him president of the American Transit Association; the 
industry‘s lobbying organization, in 1964.  He belonged to a number of organizations, 
both professional and civic.28  Midland investors attracted him by making him an equity 
partner to help enact the necessary changes to make the Milwaukee operation 
profitable.29  
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Johnson brought with him a sound management philosophy.  This philosophy 
would remain unchanged during his tenure.  He revealed his philosophy in a press 
interview:  
Like Woolworth‘s, transit is now a five-and-dime business, and to make it 
work, overhead must be cut to the bone and efficiency developed to the 
nth degree.  Scheduling and maintenance are the heart and soul of any 
mass transit company and the most important factors in making it a 
success or failure.30   
Mass transit needed to be a skeleton operation to succeed in postwar America, 
according to Johnson.  Johnson called transit management a compromise between 
―what you‘d like to provide and what you know your riders can afford to pay for.‖31  With 
ridership declining, his philosophy entailed reducing service, eliminating the advertising 
budget, and cutting employees through attrition.  Cutting routes or increasing headways 
reduced required equipment and personnel.32  These efficiencies allowed Johnson to 
release 10 percent of the Transport Co. workforce.33  Johnson also reinvested in 
Transport Co.  In the 1950s, the Transport Co. purchased 164 new buses over a seven 
year period, replacing streetcars but also upgrading the existing fleet.34  His philosophy 
of ―cookie cutter transit‖ was profitable, but drew the ire of the local communities, as 
service reductions and fare increases sustained the companies but reduced coverage 
for local communities.  
Johnson believed cooperation with local politicians could aid in a company‘s 
success.  After acquisition of the Indianapolis outfit, Johnson wrote, 
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Productive joint effort and constructive action by the municipality, civic 
leaders and the company can yield large returns to the people of 
Indianapolis in the form of better transportation through improved traffic 
flow…We will continue to search for new and better ways of conducting 
operations, maintaining vehicles and other property, to explore every 
possibility of increasing the average speed of our transit vehicles, to tailor 
our service to the changing needs of the riding public and to work for 
maximum use of the city‘s streets for the movement of people.35 
Johnson found little political support in the strong automobile culture in Indianapolis, but 
he found success in Milwaukee.36  With great political support, Johnson initiated the 
Freeway Flyer, an express bus program that utilized newly constructed interstates to 
shuttle commuters from suburban parking lots into downtown Milwaukee.  The program 
was successful.37  In Louisville, Johnson encountered similar resistance as in 
Indianapolis, but near the end of private ownership, Louisville politicians subsidized the 
private corporation to maintain fares.38  This subsidization revealed the politicians‘ 
commitment to transit in Louisville.  Out of the three cities, Indianapolis politicians 
seemed the least cooperative.  Their failure to cooperate had serious repercussions for 
mass transit, both during and after private ownership. 
Johnson‘s philosophy proved successful in Milwaukee.  In an evaluation of the 
Transport Co. (1970), the Chicago engineering firm Barton-Aschmann concluded that 
Transport Co. had lower operating and administrative costs than five similarly-sized 
cities, buses were ―clean and well maintained,‖ and the Freeway Flyer service was 
innovative.39  The engineers also noted management‘s fiscal acuity.  The company 
retired all previous stock, successfully met the cost of conversion to diesel buses, and 
maintained a low average age for buses.40  These initiatives were difficult considering 
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the growing operating expenses and decreasing ridership.  Johnson made transit 
profitable and investors enjoyed the dividends he created.41 
Milwaukee‘s success proved the viability of Johnson‘s philosophy and provided a 
blueprint for Indianapolis and Louisville.  The ownership of Indianapolis Transit Systems, 
Inc. (ITS), Louisville Transit Company (LTC), and Transport Co. is complicated and 
illustrated in Figure 1.  In 1954, the five investors, Frederick Johnson and a few other 
minor investors, incorporated the Midland Transportation Corporation (Midland) in 
Delaware with the purpose of providing transportation services.  They acquired the ITS 
in 1956 and then acquired LTC through ITS in 1958.42  No evidence suggests that 
Transport Co. was under Midland‘s umbrella.  The investors rewarded Johnson, naming 
him president of LTC, board chairman and director of ITS, in addition to his presidency 
at Transport Co.43  There was ownership presence on each board, but if the evidence 
from ITS is any indication, the role of the board was merely to rubber stamp the 
decisions made by management.  The owners limited their interference, leaving daily 
operating decisions to Johnson and existing management teams.44 
The three companies shared other similarities.  The Amalgamated Transit Union 
(ATU) represented the workers of all three companies: Local 1070 in Indianapolis, 998 in 
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Milwaukee, and 1447 in Louisville.45  ATU International philosophies imbedded 
themselves in local contracts because ATU sent knowledgeable and experienced 
representatives to aid in local negotiations.  The uniqueness of transit workers‘ skills, 
combined with ATU‘s negotiation centralization strategy, provided the unions with 
negotiating power.  The ownership similarity bred familiarity for management‘s team at 
the negotiating table, allowing Midland some balance in negotiations.  The weakness of 
the industry in postwar America also favored owners at the negotiating table.  Unions 
leveraged strikes in early twentieth century to their favor, as any strike could halt all 
urban activities.  As transit declined, so did the union‘s leverage.  Concessions workers 
won rarely outweighed the resulting ridership and goodwill losses.46   
Investors benefitted from the geographic proximity of the companies, providing a 
convenient travel area.  Board members and executives could easily commute between 
the three cities for board meetings.47  Given the overlapping board members, members 
could hold different meetings in the same location on the same day.48  Holding meetings 
on the same day was for business efficiency and considering the relative unimportance 
of the individual boards, this convenience allowed the directors to focus on activities that 
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were more important.  The board members reviewed the business activities of each 
company, but merely rubberstamped the decisions of Johnson, trusting his judgment.   
As significant as their similarities were, their differences were equally significant.  
The similarities allowed private owners to profit while the differences allowed each transit 
system to grow differently and to take different manifestations under public ownership.  
Milwaukee enjoyed a stronger base of transit riders, due to its age, geography, and 
higher density.  The stronger transit culture allowed owners more flexibility in innovative 
techniques, such as the Freeway Flyer.  Milwaukee and Louisville operated under 
Five Investors
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Suburban 
Transport 
Company
Mid-Empire Corp. Transport-Ads
Midland 
Transportation 
Corporation
Indianapolis 
Transit Systems
Louisville Transit 
Company
Midland 
Industries
Figure 1.  Ownership Hierarchy of Midland Transportation.  This is the best visual representation of 
corporate control of the various transit companies to the period up to 1964 using existing historical 
documents.  After 1964, Louisville Transit Company split from Indianapolis Transit Systems and 
became directly owned by Midland and Frederick Johnson.   
47 
 
franchises, while Indianapolis did not.49  The franchise dictated management‘s 
operational responsibilities and outlined the procedure for public takeover or private 
cessation of services.  In Indianapolis‘ case, state and local law outlined the procedure 
to allow for public purchase and operation.  Another difference was the physical 
structure of each system.  ITS had a radial layout, with routes originating from downtown 
and with limited cross town routes.  The Transport Co. and LTC enjoyed a grid layout, 
which had more cross town routes, enabling better service and transfers.50  Johnson 
adjusted the structures initially but a complete overhaul was unnecessary.   
Johnson‘s philosophy encouraged cost-effective modernization.  A tenth 
anniversary advertisement for the Transport Co. highlighted their modernization 
program.  Since new ownership, Transport Co. had purchased 267 new buses, plus 
other vehicles, for $7,300,000; expanded the garage and service facility for $550,000; 
and completed other facility upgrades totaling $1,300,000, putting the overall investment 
at $9,000,000.51  Schultz noted both the success of the modernization program and its 
uniqueness in the industry:   
M&ST was well pleased with the results of its modernization program, 
especially because in addition to the expected benefits, patronage 
increased in 1965 over the preceding year for the first time in 20 years.  
This was a local situation, not a national trend, and management 
attributed the increase to an improved image brought about by the new-
look bus fleet, new routings, and high employment levels in the 
Milwaukee area.52 
The modernization program improved the transit company‘s image and ridership.  
Capital upgrades meant better, more reliable buses with amenities like air conditioning 
and better seating.  The program‘s success convinced management to continue 
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purchasing new equipment.53  The modernization program also meant the retirement of 
gasoline buses, streetcars, and trackless trolleys, and equaled greater maintenance 
efficiencies. 
This goal [uniform equipment roster] was a perfectly standard one for the 
industry at that time, in the face of steady declines in patronage and 
increases in costs.  It represented quite a change from 10 years earlier, 
when M&ST was operating streetcars, trackless trolleys, gasoline buses, 
and diesel buses from six different manufacturers.54 
 
Reducing the variety of vehicles and models increased efficiency.  Maintenance men no 
longer needed training on how to maintain several different vehicles, nor would the 
various vehicle parts needed to be stored.  Modernization occurred at both ITS and 
LTC.55  These modernization campaigns revealed a desire by Johnson to reinvest in the 
companies.  Declining ridership limited reinvestment, and Johnson‘s efficiencies erased 
much of the goodwill modernization created. 
Johnson‘s efficiencies benefitted investors and himself through annual dividends.  
All three transit companies paid reasonable dividends.  While the first year of LTC 
ownership yielded no dividends, from 1959 to 1971, LTC paid dividends totaling 
$2,044,720.56  ITS paid out similar dividends during this time period.57  Johnson 
benefited as well, with shares in Midland, Transport Co., ITS, and LTC.58  For example, 
every LTC dividend, on average $4, Johnson netted at least $22,000.  Johnson‘s 
investment in all three meant considerable return when dividends were paid.  The 
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dividend of these companies met all legal standards for investment return, but as 
efficiency efforts continued, local communities attacked the payouts as raids on the 
company coffers. 
Communities complained of the dividends while watching service cut, but each 
community passed early opportunities to purchase the companies.  Milwaukee skirted 
with public ownership in 1951, but the city Public Utilities Committee denied the 
purchase.59  Indianapolis passed had an opportunity in the early 1930s.60  Louisville‘s 
franchise allowed for public takeover when service was deemed unsatisfactory.61  Each 
community lionize While communities cried foul at company efficiency tactics, each 
community had an early chance at public ownership but failed to capitalize. 
Midland and Johnson capitalized on the refusal of politicians to subsidize mass 
transit, utilizing the cookie-cutter transit philosophy to yield dividends.  Modernization 
programs improved each system and investors received annual dividends.  Riders 
enjoyed the benefits of modernization and service improvements.  Johnson‘s philosophy 
proved only a stopgap measure to transit‘s decline. 
Transit Struggles 
Veteran management and ownership stability could only mitigate, not prevent, 
the outside factors undermining the entire industry.  Among them, the most damaging 
was industrial relations and inflation.  The only tools to counteract these outside factors 
were reactionary and forced company decisions that communities disliked.   
The combination of declining ridership and increasing costs trapped the 
companies in an inevitable downward spiral.  LTC ridership decreased nearly 50 percent 
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from 1961 to 1971, while operating expenses rose nearly 15 percent.62  Beginning in 
1967, inflation increased rapidly, pushing operating expenses higher.  Cost-of-living 
clauses in their collective bargaining agreements resulted in staggering wage increases.  
The increased wage increases, combined with declining ridership, required management 
to increase fares, which reduced ridership and necessitated service reductions.  This 
resulting deficit sparked a series of fare increases: 1963 (25¢), 1967 (30¢), 1969 (35¢), 
and 1971 (40¢).63  This cycle was also known as the vicious cycle.64  Indianapolis and 
Milwaukee encountered similar operational problems and employed a similar strategy, 
encountering similar public resistance as the cycle continued.65 
Looking for efficiencies, the companies petitioned to raise fares and eliminate 
student subsidized fares.  Management argued that any discounted pass subsidized that 
rider, transferring the cost to the company and other riders.  ITS‘ Annual Report of 1968 
outlined Johnson‘s position:   
Certainly the major source of additional revenue to be considered will be 
in school fares…These younger people require more supervision than 
adults and moreover their service requirement overlap the morning break 
during which time adults are being carried to work and this requires more 
buses and drivers and the conduct and the ensuing vandalism by these 
students has become almost unbelievably bad.  No privately-owned 
enterprise can reasonably be expected to take the abuse that our 
company has experienced from the students during the past year.66 
 
Student vandalism caused headaches for management, especially for ITS, where the 
problem was severe enough that management stopped replacing broken windows 
because of the prohibitive replacement costs.  The petition created a stir, as parents and 
educators argued that higher student fares might increase absenteeism.  In the case of 
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students, the historical nature of subsidization made elimination of the subsidization 
difficult for management.   
The company fare increases prompted petitions for a subsidized senior fare by 
senior citizen groups and advocates.  Johnson addressed the petitions:   
The Company‘s position in this case is that a reduction in fares for senior 
citizens would result in a net loss of revenue and it would be necessary to 
increase the fares of other riders to make up the loss.  This cost should 
be met by the entire community and not solely by other bus riders.67   
 
Advocates justified the reduced fare based on the precarious financial position of senior 
citizens, since most senior citizens riding transit lived on a fixed income.  For these 
riders, transportation was necessary for medical services, grocery shopping, and 
community events.  In Indianapolis and Louisville, requests by senior citizens for 
discounted fares met similar resistance.  The company position against both subsidized 
fares further damaged transit‘s image and the image of private ownership.68  The lack of 
existing subsidized senior citizen fares and transit‘s financial precariousness made 
implementation of a subsidized fare nearly impossible. 
The efficiency tactics and company position on reduced fares damaged transit‘s 
fragile public image and stirred public opposition.  To complicate matters further, 
marketing departments were victims of Johnson‘s efficiency cuts, leaving the companies 
with few avenues to repair their public image while cutting service and increasing fares.69  
LTC‘s petition in 1972 to raise adult fares to 50 cents stirred the Louisville community.  
The Louisville city government formally opposed the fare increase.70  In a letter to the 
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KDMV, Louisville Mayor Frank Burke attacked LTC‘s profitability and the company‘s 
failure to purchase new equipment since 1968.71  KDMV reluctantly granted LTC‘s 
petition, forcing Louisville residents to pay some of the highest fares in the country.  A 
Louisville government public transit report commented, ―The controversy surrounding 
this latest fare increase [1972] has brought the present transit condition into the 
forefronts of the minds of the citizenry of the entire Louisville community.‖72  Louisville‘s 
reaction echoed outcries in Milwaukee and Indianapolis.  As fares rose, so did the 
volume of opposition.  The public perception of the companies continued to fall and it 
was clear by the time of the fare increase that the communities were in the middle of a 
transit crisis. 
Since ownership was not local, opponents noted the companies‘ complete 
disregard of community values by decreasing service and increasing fares.  Manuel 
Gottlieb, professor of economics at University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, was one of the 
biggest contemporary opponents.  In a speech at a WPSC fare hearing, he outlined 
several negative tactics employed by Transport Co management:   
They or their principal officers have a contemptuous attitude toward the 
transportation needs of Milwaukee citizens, they have a wholly 
unimaginative concept of pricing policy, and they have carelessly 
permitted inconvenient forms of service to develop which have actually 
penalized many bus passengers and have further hastened the decline of 
the bus service.73 
 
Gottlieb‘s statement echoed sentiments by Milwaukee politicians.  A resolution by a city 
alderman assailed Transport Co. policies:   
The local consumer has been ruthlessly exploited in the interest of 
preserving corporate profits…the unconscionable operating cuts recently 
[1974] requested will further erode the means of travel available to our 
most needy citizens and accelerate the loss of ridership; and Whereas, 
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This concern has systematically pursued a course of action designed to 
threaten the Milwaukee public with a total loss of mass transportation.74   
 
Gottlieb‘s accusations were common among all three communities.  Residents felt as 
though Johnson and Midland were guilty of unethical actions by cutting operations and 
increasing fares all while paying dividends.  As such, the public perception was that the 
managers were simply puppets for greedy, profit-hungry oafs of owners with little 
concern for the consequences of their decisions upon the local community.   
Aside from ignoring community values, Gottlieb accused the company of ignoring 
employee safety during a rash of violent armed robberies.  The robberies plagued 
companies nationwide in the 1960s, and initial solutions were either too expensive or 
ineffective.  Violence in Milwaukee did not escalate to the point where management 
needed to take drastic measures, like in Louisville.  The surprising string of bus driver 
beatings and shootings at the LTC prompted management to place armed policemen on 
some night rungs.75  The industry found a suitable solution, the Ready-Fare program, 
which reduced armed robberies significantly.76  Management‘s handling of robberies in 
Milwaukee was a lesson in cost-benefit analysis.  Placing armed police on every run was 
cost-prohibitive, as were most of the other alternatives.  As evidenced by LTC, when 
attacks became routine and especially violent, management acted to resolve the issue 
as quickly as possible.  Management gained nothing from ignoring robberies that 
threatened their employees and their bankroll. 
Opponents to management pointed to other deficiencies, especially the declining 
service.  In a 1968 Louisville Times article, reporter David Diaz called existing public 
transportation to industrial areas ―spotty,‖ and cited examples where residents lacked job 
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access because of the state of public transportation.77  University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee students created their own transit guide, alarmed by the paucity of material 
available for the layman.  Comparing Transport Co.‘s historical service, they argued: 
It is important to understand these trends because the demand for a 
transit service is dependent upon how the transit rider here in Milwaukee 
perceives the quality of service s/he currently is paying for, in relation to 
what it formerly was and will be in the future.  That transit rider is not 
affected by the quality of service offered in other cities.  It is also the 
same perception of quality that often determines whether a transit rider 
will continue to ride the bus, or whether s/he will switch to the 
automobile.78 
 
The authors distinguish their publication from government reports, which compared 
service to similarly-sized cities.  After analyzing the service trend, the authors concluded, 
―When all of these indicators of service are compared, it is clear that there has been a 
substantial decline in the overall quality of the system.‖79  The community based their 
perception of transit service on the local historical service trend, which continued to 
decline.  However, the busses continued to run.  Management was able to sustain 
operations while other companies went bankrupt.   
 The regularity of fare increases concerned local politicians, who recognized the 
critical service mass transit provided for the fringe populations of their communities.  The 
Milwaukee Transportation Committee declared ―substantial concern‖ over fare increases 
and urged some level of government to subsidize mass transit.80  The city council also 
resisted the Transport Co.‘s 33 percent increase, but the resistance was superficial for 
two reasons.  First, the Transport Co. was legally entitled to enough revenue to make a 
reasonable profit.  Second, Milwaukee politicians were not eager to enter into the mass 
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transit business.81  These two points were universal in Indianapolis and Louisville, where 
government bodies spouted rhetoric over fare increases and the increases harmful effect 
on the poorest urban element.82  Politicians acknowledged the plight of mass transit in 
their communities, but acted slowly to solve the problem, uninterested in carrying the 
burden of a publicly-owned mass transit system. 
Regulatory boards legislated to protect residents ended up spending the final 
years of private ownership protecting private investment while increasing the financial 
burdens of transit captives.  Members of regulatory boards in Milwaukee and 
Indianapolis voiced concern over fare increases, but acknowledged their own legal 
responsibility.  After approving a ten cent increase in adult fares, WPSC Chairman 
William Eich wrote a concurring opinion that outlined reasons and concerns over the 
recent fare increase.  The higher fares maintained existing service, while maintain fares 
reduced service.  Eich and the WPSC hoped the increase allowed local government the 
opportunity to agree, ―on a method of public operation or support of the transit system, 
the service and equipment will not have deteriorated to the extent that the entire system 
will have to be rebuilt from scratch.‖83  Eich also recognized the board‘s legal 
responsibility to allow the Transport Co. to recover a reasonable investment.  The 
regulatory entities in all three states recognized the mass transit problem as both social 
and local, and hoped fare increases maintained service until government intervention. 
The fare increases only delayed the inevitable end of private ownership.  
Juxtaposing two ITS annual reports highlights the industry‘s volatility.  The Annual 
Report of 1967 featured Johnson welcoming the stabilization of ridership over the 
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previous three years.  Johnson noted, ―To keep the system sound and vital, we intend to 
pursue our present policy of acquiring more new equipment and improving service.‖84  A 
steep ridership drop and increased operating expenses prompted Johnson to write one 
year later, ―There is growing concern at this writing about the economic future of the 
company.‖85  Management recognized and emphasized that transit could not continue in 
private ownership, even with aggressive efficiency steps and fare increases.  In 
Transport Co.‘s 1969 Annual Report, Johnson confessed that private ownership could 
no longer survive.  Johnson continued:  
The time has come for a community decision.  The Company, of course, 
wishes to continue to provide the best possible transit service but it needs 
an adequate fare structure to recover the costs of operations as well as to 
provide a reasonable return to the investors.  If the Milwaukee community 
desires a higher quality of service than riding will justify and wants to keep 
transit fares below the cost of this service, then a subsidized public 
ownership of this transit operation is the only alternative.86 
 
This paragraph summed up ownership‘s position on fare increases and the continuation 
of operations.  The community would have to decide whether continued transit service at 
existing levels was worth subsidization.  If not, the community would experience 
continued service decreases and fare increases until bankruptcy. 
The tense relationship between management, riders, and local politicians erupted 
into outright hostility during the final years of private ownership.  Outside factors negated 
management attempts to provide transportation at a reasonable cost with adequate 
return.  Management efficiencies outraged residents who perceived Midland and 
Johnson as opportunistic vultures.  Local politicians initially hoped for continued private 
ownership, but regular fare increases prompted denunciations of private tactics and 
undesired steps towards government intervention.87  Politicians were careful to distance 
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potential public ownership from the tactics of private management and to promote the 
potential benefits of public ownership.  Public ownership, argued politicians and 
advocates, would put the interests of riders first, not the interests of stockholders.  
Communities hesitated to subsidize mass transit, but the growing recognition of the 
importance of mass transit to transit captives forced communities into the mass transit 
business. 
Midland‘s experiment into mass transit was a success, despite all three 
succumbing to public ownership.  Johnson and the investors managed to tailor the 
particular systems to maintain the company.  Midland left the companies with clean, 
albeit used, buses, talented management, and veteran employees.  Their careful bus 
maintenance and prudent financial moves benefitted both the communities and Midland.  
Midland maximized their return and communities acquired well-run, if skeleton, mass 
transit systems.  These same business decisions strained relations between the 
community and ownership, creating hostile environments during public meetings and 
regulatory hearings.  Management became a scapegoat for the largely-uncontrollable 
demise of privately-owned transit.  For the communities, management was the 
embodiment of cruel capitalists, exploiting the weakest people in the population.  The 
negative stigma placed on private ownership overshadowed management‘s efforts, 
especially their aggressive modernization campaigns.  Lastly, Midland‘s purchase 
provided riders with experienced, talented, and devoted managers who tried to provide 
safe, reliable, and friendly service. 
As these three companies entered the 1970s, each had a tenuous financial 
position and pressed the need for public involvement.  Settled in the crossfire were the 
mainly politically ineffective transit riders, the uninvolved politicians, and the weary 
managers.  The local debate over mass transit in Indianapolis provides a glimpse into 
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the multitude of actors and externalities that combine, in urban areas, to determine the 
identity of the urban area.   
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Chapter Three: 
 
Riding Red Ink: The End of Private Ownership in Indianapolis 
 
 
On Monday, 4 October 1971, two hundred Indianapolis residents, including  
―senior citizens…and representatives of labor union, youth and other groups, ―attended a 
City-County Council meeting to ―urge the city to take over the operation of the 
Indianapolis Transit System, Inc.‖ 1  Thirty-six citizens addressed the council during the 
two and one-half hour session following the regular council session.  The newly-formed 
Coalition for Adequate Transportation (CAT), represented by Reverend T. Garrott 
Benjamin, Jr., was present.  Rev. Benjamin wrote, ―‘We are saying we want fair, first-
class public transportation in Indianapolis and we are willing to stand up for a city that 
will assume that responsibility.‘‖2  Reduced fares for senior citizens dominated most 
agendas.  The turnout was in response to a ten cent fare increase by ITS.  A reporter 
noted, ―Councilmen have indicated a reluctance to favor a city takeover of the transit 
system, mainly because bond issue would be required and property tax revenue of 
about $1.8 million a year would be lost.‖3 
The fare increase and resulting public outcry were early indicators of a transit 
crisis.  This community transit crisis was a result of growing recognition of ITS‘ inevitable 
cessation of service.  Local experience with private ownership produced a certain 
expectation for public ownership to distance itself from the vicious cycle and provide 
necessary service for transit captives.  Government publications, and transit advocates, 
concluded that transit was necessary for transit captives.  Politicians agreed that urban 
areas needed mass transit, even as the subsidization of the necessary service 
concerned politicians, suburbanites, and the local media.  Indianapolis politicians and 
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voters faced balancing the needs of captives and with the economics of a public transit 
corporation.  Guided by professional engineering reports, politicians negotiated the 
future mobility of Indianapolis and maintained the built landscaped dedicated to 
automobile travel. 
Public ownership in Indianapolis, largely ignored by local historians, presents an 
opportunity to examine the origin of modern mass transportation services in 
Indianapolis.4  Examining community expectations for a publicly owned transportation 
corporation aids in understanding the priorities of that corporation and transit in 
Indianapolis.  The Public Service Commission of Indiana (PSCI) provides the perfect 
forum for examining the tension between the cast of historical actors and analyzing the 
community conversation on mass transit.  From newspaper articles and PSCI hearings, 
riders emphasized mobility, not environmental benefits, downtown revitalization, or 
transit workers‘ wages.  In legal lexicon, the community was concerned with ―adequate 
transportation.‖5  Negotiations between state and local bureaucrats, influenced by 
suburbanites, riders, and community organizations, determined the future mobility of 
Indianapolis residents. 
―We must have adequate bus service‖: The Beginning of the End in Indianapolis 
Citizens Street Rail Road Company of Indianapolis introduced mass transit, via 
the mule-pulled streetcar, to the Circle City.  Enthusiastic residents utilized the new 
transportation mode for work and pleasure.  Thirty years later, electrified streetcars 
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replaced the odorous, overworked, and expensive mules and horses.6  Due to high 
capital costs, the existing private companies consolidated in 1899 under the new name, 
Indianapolis Street Railways, Inc., but the system continued to struggle.  Indianapolis 
Street Railways enacted a modernization program to attract new riders, upgrade the 
system, and generate revenue.  Successful implementation of modernization preceded 
the hardships of the Great Depression.  World War II rubber and petroleum rationing 
boosted ridership, but strained existing equipment.  Ridership declined with the lifting of 
wartime rationing, increased affluence, increased automobile production, and road 
improvements.  Indianapolis sprawled over central Indiana as automobiles allowed 
residents to move farther from downtown, into new suburban homes, and away from 
established mass transit routes. 
With ridership in decline, Midland purchased ITS in 1953 and turned ITS into a 
profitable enterprise while retaining existing management personnel.7  The retention of 
management showed confidence in the manager‘s ability to enact efficiency cuts.  Edgar 
Claffey, president from 1963 to 1975, was a good example of the veteran transit 
management that existed at ITS.  Claffey distinguished himself enough to be elected 
ATA president, a position that Johnson once held.8  Existing veteran management 
employed Johnson‘s efficiency cuts successfully.  As one engineering firm explained:  
―Management, being skillful, knowledgeable and desirous of profit undoubtedly pared the 
‗fat‘ if any existed.‖9  Management replaced old equipment, instituted a strict 
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maintenance program, and substituted trackless trolleys with buses.  Cheaper Buses 
were cheaper capital purchases, and required little additional capital investment, unlike 
streetcars and trackless trolleys.  Additionally, ITS profited from the salvaging of 
overhead wires, rails, and equipment.10  The numbers speak for themselves:  ITS lost 
$810,944.71 in 1954 but recorded a profit of $80,482.28 the following year.11  Profitability 
continued for nearly twenty years, an aberration in the industry.12  
Management‘s success could not overcome several external and internal 
problems, which continued to erode the already small ridership numbers at ITS.  ITS 
recorded 44 million riders in 1954 and the number went down thereafter.  Gannet and 
Fleming determined that ITS lost 35.9 percent of its total revenue passengers between 
1962 to 1972.13  Postwar affluence, expressed through suburbanization and increased 
automobile sales, misbehaving students, and political apathy presented problems for 
management. 
Organized labor presented both a temporary and continuing challenge to 
management.  The organized workforce enjoyed adequate benefits and wages through 
collective bargaining agreements that typically lasted two years.  Renegotiated contracts 
increased operational costs, contributing to the vicious cycle, a persistent problem for 
management.  The temporary issue came in 1954 when Local 1070 went on strike, 
demanding better pension benefits, after Midland refused arbitration.  The 42 day strike 
allowed choice riders the opportunity to explore other transportation options, namely the 
automobile.  Automobile retailers promoted bargains for stranded riders and downtown 
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retailers marketed their phone order business.14  The 1954 strike was ―a setback from 
which the system never fully recovered.‖15  Johnson in the Annual Report of 1955 that, 
―our employees, aware of the lower level of riding following the strike and the resulting 
financial losses, notified the management of their desire to continue the present contract 
until its expiration date.‖16  The 1954 strike revealed the waning leverage of a transit 
strike and highlighted the fragility of mass transit in Indianapolis.  This was the last strike 
under private ownership, but the renegotiated collective bargaining agreements, granting 
higher wages, contributed to the vicious cycle and highlighted the critical role organized 
labor played in ITS‘ final years. 
Labor‘s prominence in mass transit overshadows the primary reason for ridership 
loss, which was increased affluence, displayed best in increased suburbanization and 
automobile ownership.  Indianapolis‘ outer townships showed tremendous population 
growth from 1950-1970.17  Suburban residential growth contributed to suburban 
commercial development and Indianapolis saw a 40 percent loss of downtown 
businesses between 1950 and 1070, which was ―much higher than the general 
experience in the transit industry.‖18  These residential and commercial losses 
contributed to the decline in ridership numbers, in part because of ITS‘ radial route 
structure, which emphasized downtown routes.  Lacking cross town options, riders faced 
high commute times traveling east to west, or vice versa.  Suburbanites faced tougher 
commutes because state law prevented ITS from operating outside Indianapolis 
municipal borders.  The law forced transfers between private suburban and urban 
carriers, who failed to position stops properly to allow for easy transfers.  The poor 
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coordination increased travel time and frustrated choice riders, who the abandoned 
transit for the automobile.  ITS offered several outside reasons for declining passenger 
numbers, including industrial work stoppages, a flu epidemic, inflation and poor 
economic conditions, and the ―unbelievably bad conduct‖ of students.19  
Poor student conduct and the historical reduce fare for students became a 
source of contention for management.  ITS management did not support it or any 
reduced fare, evidenced in the Annual Report of 1967:   
The transportation of students continues to be a growing problem and, as 
has been said many times before, there is no logical reason for reduced 
student fares.  Not only is the basic cost of transporting students higher 
than that of providing regular service, but vandalism from this riding group 
is reaching a critical stage.20 
 
Already dealing with low ridership numbers and robberies, management needed no 
further hurdles to a profitable business.  This sentiment continued in subsequent 
writings, ―the conduct and the ensuing vandalism by these students [have] become 
almost unbelievably bad‖ and that vandalism and lost time should be factored into 
considering a full fare for students.21  The students were constant nuisances and broke 
the windows with such frequency that management considered window replacement 
cost prohibitive.22  A Star letter to the editor entitled, ―Tarzan of Apes on Bus?‖ captured 
one incident of student misbehavior.  ―About the 1200 block a big fight started in the rear 
of the bus, and about 20 kids were jumping up and down like Indians…I can imagine 
what powers the bus driver might have—none.‖23  The author, Morgan Ray, witnessed 
boys swinging from the bars of ITS Bus No. 1408.  Students were a distraction for the 
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bus drivers and their behavior alienated other patrons, contributing to the loss of 
additional ridership.  
Minimal local government attention towards mass transit and counterproductive 
public policies hindered ITS operations further.  Johnson‘s policy towards government 
entities was one of cooperation.  Johnson‘s philosophy included government 
cooperation.  He wrote, ―Productive joint effort and constructive action by the 
municipality, civic leaders and the company can yield large returns to the people of 
Indianapolis.‖24  One ITS initiative to increase service using downtown bus express lanes 
received initial cooperation but ultimately failed as a result of an enforcement failure.25  
This particular failure marks one of the few instances of Indianapolis cooperation with 
ITS.  Another frustration came as a government response to a myriad of urban ills, the 
Model Cities program.  As part of the program, a free mini-bus system operated in a 
rebuilding downtown neighborhood.  ITS management responded: ―The company is in 
complete accord with the efforts to aid the underprivileged but it cannot overlook the fact 
that the loss of regular patrons is the major problem with which it is constantly 
confronted.‖26  It took months of negotiation, but the city and ITS reached a compromise 
that replaced the Model Cities buses with two ITS routes.  The Model Cities program 
was just another obstacle for ITS.  Individually, the obstacles were minor but the 
accumulation of obstacles began to hinder profitable operation. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the precarious balance between operating expenses 
and the fare box buckled.  The greatest change in this period was the combination of 
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increasing inflation and declining ridership.  The cost-of-living escalator clause included 
in most collective bargaining agreements and in the local agreement in 1967 maintained 
the real wage by providing compensation tied to the consumer price index.  As inflation 
ratcheted upwards in the late 1960s, the escalator clause provided workers with 
compensation additional to any negotiated annual raises.  The increased wages strained 
company finances.  The 1967 collective bargaining agreement accelerated the vicious 
cycle of service reductions, fare hikes, and ridership decline.27 
The rapid acceleration of the vicious cycle in 1967 began the rhetoric of public 
ownership.  The year 1967 was a successful one for ITS, as it realized the stabilization 
of ridership.  Johnson wrote: ―To keep the system sound and vital, we intend to pursue 
our present policy of acquiring more new equipment and improving service.‖28  The 
future looked more promising than in recent years.  This opinion was short lived as just 
two years later, ITS warned, ―There is growing concern at this writing about the 
economic future of the company.‖29  Management amplified those concerns the next 
year, writing, ―It is increasingly obvious that public ownership in some form is 
inevitable.‖30  ITS discontinued purchasing new buses, reasoning that additional 
purchases required additional revenues or reduced service.31  With ridership still 
slumping in 1972, ITS knew its survival required public assistance.32  In a short span, the 
vicious cycle consumed all hope of continued private ownership and assured that 
Indianapolis needed to subsidize ITS. 
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ITS met with Lugar in 1973, to make him ―cognizant of the company‘s perilous 
situation,‖33 and emphasized the ―necessity of immediate action by the City of 
Indianapolis to avoid the abandonment of transit operations.‖34  The city had prepared 
itself, ordering an evaluation of ITS after the fare increase in 1971.  This report became 
the first official publication to echo the inevitable: ―We predict that private enterprise will 
not continue to provide transit service in Indianapolis and that the end of private 
enterprise is rapidly approaching.‖35  Lugar‘s administration had avoided what Johnson 
knew for three years and now needed to prepare itself for public ownership.  Indianapolis 
would not purchase a lemon.  The engineering company found that management was 
excellent, the company had ―one of the better physical plants in the transit industry,‖ 
―schedules [were] models of efficiency,‖ and operations were good to excellent.36  The 
report revealed that ITS might not provide the best service but it was an efficient 
operation. 
Community groups were not impressed with ITS‘ efficient operation and hoped 
public ownership could create comprehensive coverage for community residents, 
especially transit captives.  Leading the campaign for public ownership was the Coalition 
for Adequate Transportation (CAT), created in the summer of 1971 and focused on 
improving all of transportation in Indianapolis.  The ―inadequacy of ITS routes and the 
great infrequency of service available‖ especially concerned CAT members.37  CAT 
believed in a comprehensive urban transportation system to provide Indianapolis 
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residents with alternatives to the automobile.38  In the handout, ―Buses Are For People:  
Mass Transportation For Greater Indianapolis,‖ CAT proposed the immediate acquisition 
of ITS; a ―no-fare public bus system‖; 500 new, air-conditioned buses; passenger 
shelters; and eight new bus routes.  CAT representatives attended public meetings with 
regularity and claimed a diverse and large number of community organizations under its 
umbrella, including the AFL-CIO Central Labor Council, Butler-Tarkington Neighborhood 
Association, Church Federation of Greater Indianapolis, Federation of Associated Clubs, 
Indiana-Indianapolis Jewish Community Relations Council, and Urban League.  The 
broad spectrum of support from such a diverse group is the important aspect of the CAT.  
Most of the groups had the primary objective of remedying urban ills.  The support of the 
Federation of Associated Clubs and the Urban League, influential African-American 
community organizations, reflected the growing concern of the African-American 
community towards the issue of urban mobility.  Absent from the CAT roll call were 
suburban community groups, an indication of the limited suburban involvement in the 
transit crisis.  CAT‘s main spokesperson was Reverend James E.  Kohls.  He strongly 
opposed ITS‘ fare increases, stating that ITS would ―have to stop high-handing this 
community,‖ especially transit captives.39 
ITS‘ fare increases and service reductions considerably affected transit captives, 
particularly senior citizens who lived on a fixed income.  Frustrated with fare increases, 
senior citizens and the CAT demanded a discounted fare from ITS.  After negotiations 
with ITS failed to produce a discounted fare, the CAT petitioned the PSCI.40  Interested 
parties signed a petition, while others voiced their opinions in letters, including state 
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Attorney General Thomas Sendak and a multitude of senior citizens.41  One letter, from 
N. Hawking, lambasted ITS, writing ―the ITS are very arbitrary and regardless of civic 
duty and obligation to the riding public.  ITS has never shown any care or consideration 
for anything except the big fat buck in their pockets of their shareholders.‖  Hawking saw 
―no reason, why ITS in all its arrogance and selfishness should be allowed to so 
thoroughly and completely disrupt our city…We must have adequate bus service.‖42  
Hawking represented a growing number of residents who denigrated ITS management 
and hoped for better mass transit.  The PSCI agreed with Hawking and the CAT, 
ordering a one year experiment for reduced senior citizen fares.43  The victory only 
further confirmed the CAT‖s role as the consistent community voice for mass transit in 
Indianapolis.  The role of the CAT would be significant in informing Indianapolis 
residents, challenging ITS, and establishing mobility expectations.  ITS‘ opposition in this 
matter further solidified the image of private management as greedy and removed from 
community values. 
Politicians and community organizations in Indianapolis believed local regulation 
would better reflect the local concerns, instead of the PSCI.  State Representative E. 
Henry Lamkin (R-Indianapolis) introduced a bill transferring regulation from the PSCI to 
IDOT.  Republican Mayor Richard Lugar supported the bill, and emphasized that 
Indianapolis will not spend public funds on transportation unless Indianapolis obtains 
regulatory control.44  The News endorsed the PSCI, writing, ―the regulatory agency 
watching over the company‘s final struggle ought not to be an arm of the governmental 
unit waiting to take over . . . the power of regulation ought to remain with the PSC[I].‖45  
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CAT leader Kohls disagreed, arguing that the conclusion that the ―Public Service 
Commission can solve the problem [ITS financial troubles]…is like seeing a man 
drowning and announcing to your friends ‗that‘s the duty of the lifeguards‘—when the 
lifeguards are off duty.‖46  Lamkin agreed that local regulation would protect affordable 
transportation without damaging ITS and its workers.47  State legislators disagreed, 
voting the bill down.  William Crawford (D-Indianapolis) opposed fragmenting PSCI 
authority and others opposed the notion that the PSCI would bankrupt ITS.48  Regulation 
could not force a profitable enterprise into subsidization.  Whether the regulatory body 
was local or state, fare increases would continue to sustain ITS and its investors. 
The effectiveness of the PSCI attracted attention outside of Indianapolis.  A non-
profit organization based out of Bloomington, Indiana, the Indiana Public Interest 
Research Group (INPiRG), had lost an extensive battle with Indiana Bell over consumer 
rate increases.  INPiRG decided to evaluate the PSCI and after an extensive 
examination, they concluded that the PSCI was not neutral and its decisions were 
products of poor funding, politics, and corporate connections.  Their conclusions 
portrayed the PSCI as a business friendly regulator and a political stepping stone.  
Unlike the powerful telecommunication companies, favoring the declining transit 
companies benefitted no one within the PSCI.  The PSCI operated under legal authority, 
which required them to weigh in the concerns of business and consumers, but their 
decisions could not require companies to operate in a deficit.  Approving ITS‘s fare 
increases made the PSCI a target of public criticism.49 
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The PSCI occupied a critical role in the transit crisis.  The only formal venue to 
challenge fare increases, it also approved fare increases.  For riders and politicians, the 
PSCI came to represent just another obstacle in a series of frustrations surrounding 
service cuts, fare hikes, and company excuses.  PSCI testimony reveals another 
dimension of the transportation debate, supplementing the frustrations voiced in 
community meetings and newspapers.  Company testimony in PSCI hearings also 
indicates a company grappling with the differing interests of providing service and paying 
out dividends.  The frequency of fare increases alarmed the PSCI, which voiced its 
concerns about the future of ITS and transit in Indianapolis. 
―Time is Running Out‖: Creating A Municipal Corporation? 
On 18 May 1973 at ITS headquarters, ITS shareholders voted on a resolution to 
surrender ITS‘ Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.  The resolution outlined 
the reasons for ceasing operations, including declining ridership and increasing costs, 
despite aggressive efficiency cuts.50  Midland‘s presence on the board and its majority 
ownership stake relegated the meeting to a mere legal formality.51  There was no 
timeline for surrender, but ITS hoped to sell the company, as a going concern, to 
Indianapolis, where Midland would receive fair market price for the enterprise.52 
Local media outlets showed concern both for the cessation of service and future 
public ownership.53  A 19 May 1973 Star editorial observed, ―The necessity for an 
adequate public transportation system is well understood.  It appears that such a system 
cannot much longer be maintained without some form of increased support from the 
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community.‖54  The increased community support included possible subsidization but not 
public ownership.  The unknown future costs of public ownership concerned the Star.55  
The more progressive News echoed those concerns and warned that the public sector, 
―subject to all the political pressures, horse-trading, bureaucratic empire-building, 
Federal guidelines and other ills that plague government-run functions, would do even 
worse‖ than ITS.56  Both newspapers agreed that mass transit served a role in the 
community but that public ownership was not an appealing option. 
The entire community showed concern over the possibility of the government‘s 
handling of mass transit.  Even the CAT, which placed public ownership as the 
community‘s first step towards solving the transit crisis, feared the resulting public 
corporation after political compromises.  Reverend Kohls dreaded ―that the approach the 
city might just provide for operating a ‗skeleton‘ bus system.‖57  Such a system would 
hardly be an improvement over ITS, once again relegating transit as the transportation 
for the poor in Indianapolis.  Residents shared Kohls‘ concern.  A survey done by the 
Department of Metropolitan Development indicated, ―There is a general lack of 
confidence on the government‘s ability to run an efficient transit system.‖58  Lugar‘s 
studious approach towards subsidized transit did little to alleviate the communities‘ 
concerns, instead agitating transit supporters who demanded speedier decisions.  Any 
delays meant the inevitable public corporation would inherit an even more skeleton 
system, with decreased service and ridership.59   
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Lugar‘s administration refused to let the community rush its decision, largely 
because of estimated operating expenses and national problems with public ownership. 
60  Consultants estimated the annual operating deficit to be from $300,000 to $500,000, 
to which Wetzel responded, ―‗I‘m not ready to take a half-million-dollar bath.‘‖ 61 For 
Wetzel and others, the main problem was the long-term financial responsibility of public 
ownership.  Public ownership in other cities faced financial hurdles that Indianapolis 
wanted to avoid.  Frank Salzuralo highlighted the troubled Bay Area Rapid Transit 
System (BART) in San Francisco and asked, ―How much tax money will it take 10 years 
from now to keep buses running in Indianapolis, if it is publicly owned?  It‘s an 
established fact such systems don‘t pay for themselves via the fare box.‖62  
Subsidization and its future costs, combined with ITS‘ low ridership numbers, fueled the 
city‘s desire to delay any decision until the last possible moment.  The politicians faced 
no dilemma until an official notification from ITS, at which point a decision was 
necessary. 
In June, Claffey requested that Indianapolis ―make a determination ‗whether it is 
in the public interest that the public acquire the system.‘‖63  The request prompted a 
rhetorical question from the Star: ―Does Indianapolis need public transport?‖  With 
40,000 regular riders of ITS, the Star editors concluded that Indianapolis needed mass 
transit for transit captives.64  Wetzel agreed and asserted, ―it‘s not our job to get people 
out of cars and into buses.‘‖65  These statements were foreboding, indicating that mass 
transit would receive few support for a complete overhaul of transit, instead maintaining 
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ITS‘ system for captive riders.  Still unsure about the direction of mass transit, Lugar 
convened a three man blue-ribbon committee.66  Comprised of prominent local 
businessmen, the committee concluded that private ownership could not continue.  The 
report put the final touches on the argument for public acquisition.  Indianapolis 
continued to delay in deciding over the form of public ownership and revenue source, 
and the vicious cycle continued to plague ITS.67 
Government delays cost riders further as spiraling costs forced ITS to raise fares 
by ten cents.  Claffey outlined ITS‘ fragile position in a letter to the PSCI, listing 
economics as reason one and ―the changing habits of people‖ as reason two.  Claffey 
emphasized labor costs as another major factor under economics but supported the 
wage levels.   
Some might argue that this being the case, payroll rates and wages are 
too high.  The irrefutable logic, however, lies in the fact that these 
employees are entitled to fair wages commensurate with those paid to 
others in jobs of a comparable nature.  This is the case.68 
 
Claffey‘s statement was a rare instance of management supporting organized 
labor, placing labor as a victim of the vicious cycle, not a conscious actor.  
Claffey blamed the ―increasing number of automobile sales,‖ ―home T.V. 
viewing,‖ and the ―decentralization and development of business and industry 
into the suburban areas‖ as factors that hurt ITS.69  Claffey squared ITS‘ demise 
on the shoulders of externalities, not managers or workers.  At this time in 1973, 
management recognized a fare increase as the only solution to the myriad of 
problems facing ITS. 
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The CAT called the latest fare increase a ―fleecing,‖ and presented an array of 
witnesses to testify against the fare increase.  Among the witnesses was Sara 
Chenoweth, Speaker Pro-Tempore for the IUPUI Consolidated Student Government.  
She opposed the fare hike, citing its negative impact on captive riders and the increase‘s 
―adverse multiplier effect.‖  This adverse multiplier effect ―reduces the desirability…to 
ride the city buses.  This encourages the auto-commuter-syndrome which is presently 
engulfing the university quarter with cars.‖  Chenoweth worried that the influx of 
automobiles would prompt a campus wide outcry for new parking lots and garages.70  
These witnesses believed that a fare increase would have greater ramifications than 
simply isolating transit captives; it could have an impact on the entire community.   
Lawyers for the CAT argued against the fare increase considering ITS continued 
to pay dividends or, as the lawyers called them, ―systematic raids.‖71  The dividends 
became one of the few legitimate arguments against fare increases.  ITS issued an 
annual dividend for almost the entire duration of Midland‘s ownership.  Shareholders 
held management accountable for adequate dividends.  The PSCI examined the 
dividends, but did not consider them exorbitant, merely just an adequate return on 
investment.  In each fare hearing, the PSCI examined dividends and came to this similar 
conclusion.72  The dividends were legitimate investment returns but to the community the 
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dividends represented ITS‘ lack of respect for struggling transit captives and the 
community as a whole. 
At stake at the hearings was more than a simple fare increase.  To comply with 
laws to receive government funds, Indianapolis needed ITS to be a going concern in 
order to purchase the company.  Without a fare increase and with finances weak, 
management did not even speculate about its future.  The petition‘s denial would push 
ITS into bankruptcy and complicate the beginning of a public corporation.  Some in the 
local media believed ITS‘ insolvency argument was merely a ploy to obtain additional 
monies from Indianapolis transit riders before public purchase.73  Possible ulterior 
motives aside, fare increases and delays had consequences.  News reporter Robert 
Basler noted, ―For both sides, time is running out, and beneath all of the dollars and 
cents considerations, there is still the question of quality of service.‖74  Any delay in 
public involvement meant more service cuts by ITS, further eroding the service level 
Indianapolis would inherit. 
Recognizing the complicated issues involved in the transit crisis, the PSCI still 
refused the fare increase, calling it unjust and unreasonable.  The PSCI determined that 
the fare increase ―would not result in a profit for the bus company, would further 
accelerate the decline in passengers, would not encourage a reduction in expenses and 
would not prevent the ITS from terminating operations.‘‖  The denial of ITS‘ petition was 
both legal and political.  The PSCI and the CAT hoped that denying the increase forced 
Indianapolis to make a decision concerning mass transit.75  
The Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee‘s transit task force released their 
report that substantiated the claims of the PSCI and the CAT.  Led by Lamkin and 
including prominent business and civic leaders, the report highlighted urban mobility: ―No 
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factor is more important to the quality of urban life than motility.  For many citizens this 
mobility will not be available unless adequate, affordable public transportation is 
provided.‖  Transit captive mobility took center stage, but the task force also highlighted 
the ―rapidly developing difficulties for any city which relies almost exclusively upon the 
private automobile for transportation.  The city can no longer afford the investments in 
land and capital to serve the automobile.‖76  Relying on the automobile for the sole 
provider of urban transportation could cost the city in both precious urban land and in 
property taxes.  The task force supported public ownership of transit, with the caveat that 
comprehensive transportation was the future.  An urban transportation network that 
included multiple forms of transportation, including light rail, would improve the quality of 
life in Indianapolis.  Such a transportation network could reduce sprawl, encourage 
higher-density development, and reduce automobile dependency.  This network would 
place Indianapolis in the competitive mix of progressive cities looking to avoid the 
unintentional negative consequences of automobile dependence.   
Frustrated residents voiced their concern over the transit crisis.  Carolyn Goode, 
member of the Transportation Committee of the League of Women Voters, called 
Indianapolis‘ decision to expand roads equivalent to ―pushing a dead horse.‖  She also 
criticized ITS, which had ―a notable lack of responsiveness to community needs‖ and did 
not ―do the job they were intended to do.‖77  Earlier in the year, Peggy Simpson 
compared ITS to the human body and begged for a blood transfusion.  Simpson urged 
ITS to, ―Give the public a good dose of incentive to ride the buses,‖ rather than fare 
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increases.78  By mid-1973, informed participants of the transit crisis knew that only a 
public agency could boost mass transit.   
The numerous transit reports convinced Lugar to request the City-County Council 
to form a public corporation to acquire ITS and operate transit, which drew the ire of 
some local media outlets.79  One suburban newspaper considered the purchase ―a 
regrettable decision in view of the other options open to the city.‖  The Northeast Topics 
criticized Lugar‘s choice and suggested one alternative, one that Lamkin proposed.  
Instead of ITS or a fixed route service, Indianapolis would contract taxi companies to 
provide transportation to transit captives.  Lamkin‘s proposal was temporary, a stopgap 
measure to allow Indianapolis leaders additional time to examine their options.  This 
delay would be costly, as in the end Indianapolis would have to create a new transit 
system.  This new system would cost millions more to create than simply overtaking the 
ITS operation.  The short-term cost of Lamkin‘s proposal looked sound, but in the long-
term, the more economical option was simply to acquire ITS.80 
The continued delay in the transit crisis sparked a satire piece by journalist David 
Rohn, in which he presented the story of Mayor Richard Frugal and the Swell Telephone 
Co.  The Telephone Co. threatened to go out of business ―because of a rejection of a 
$223 million rate increase proposal,‖ which Swell needed so the company ―can continue 
to operate on a profit margin of only 15 per cent.‖  Frugal appointed ―three task forces to 
make thorough examinations of how to meet the crisis,‖ an obvious condemnation of 
Lugar‘s insistence to convene multiple committees.  Rohn explained the alternatives if 
Swell went bankrupt, including a smoke signal system or ―flagmen located on the tallest 
buildings.  At night we could have a system of flashing lights to transmit 
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communications.‖81  Rohn portrayed both sides negatively, but he paid careful attention 
to the profits of ITS, Lugar‘s delaying tactics, and the lack of adequate alternatives.  This 
satire is another example of the media‘s growing frustration and disappointment, also 
evidenced by the usually anti-public purchase bias of editorial cartoons (Figures 2 and 
3).  For example, one cartoon featured Lugar convincing a beleaguered taxpayer to 
purchase ITS.  The cartoonists, especially for the conservative Star, critiqued the public 
purchase, portraying ITS as rundown and the acquisition as a fleecing of local taxpayers.   
Indianapolis leaders could delay no longer.  The deadline for municipal budgets 
loomed in August, and a board without financial support could jeopardize purchasing 
negotiations and the transportation of thousands of transit captives.  After some 
inactivity, the City-County Council had to vote to create a public transit agency and 
approve a board all in the same night.  That same board would only have three days to 
approve a working budget.82  The News questioned the speedy decision and noted that 
there was ―no decent interval permitted between the hearing of testimony and the hour 
of decision . . . once again the public has been effectively blocked out from knowing 
what the council and city administration are doing.‖83  The News polled the council on 
their possible vote.  Donald Griffith (R) explained, ―I plan to vote for it because I don‘t 
see any alternative‖ which echoed Alan Kimbell (R), ―I‘m supporting the administration 
because the alternatives are unacceptable to me.‖  Critics of the proposal observed that 
Indianapolis would be ―taxing areas where they are not going to get the service.‖84  
Indianapolis politicians felt the lack of alternatives and ITS‘ failure forced public 
ownership.85 
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As testament to the idea of forced public ownership, the reactionary City-County 
Council waited until the last session before deciding on the tax levy.  After a successful 
vote to amend the resolution, a discussion followed and then a request by several 
Democrats to recess, which was defeated.  After the defeated recess motion, six of the 
eight Democrats left the chambers.86  The remaining members voted to exclude the 
members during the vote.  Even with a Republican majority, the proposal met with 
resistance.  After forty minutes of discussion, the proposal passed with the minimum of 
fifteen votes and only after Councilman Dwight Cottingham changed his vote. 
Cottingham admitted that he changed his mind only because ―‗there [was] no real 
good alternative.‘  He said there was no ‗arm-twisting‘ to get him to change his vote.‖87  
The Star considered Cotthinham‘s explanation, ―a wishy-washy reason to vote for 
something that may prove more and more costly to the taxpayers as time goes on‖ and 
called the Council vote ―bobtailed.‖  The editors noted, ―the action the council eventually 
took seems to have been pretty high-handed and a long way short of the good 
government citizens hope for, but so seldom seem to get these days.  But the deed is 
done.‖ 88  Seven members voted nay, citing high taxes, the hasty proceedings, and 
concern over public efficiency.89  The tense environment surrounding the creation of the 
new public transit corporation created a poor atmosphere for public trust in the 
government revamping transit. 
The city and its politicians created the new public corporation as a reaction to the 
reality that a first-class city must have mass transit, regardless of the subsidies needed  
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Figure 2.  ―And It‘s Only Had One Owner!‖ Typical of editorial cartoons surrounding the purchase, a sharp-
dressed Lugar is shown trying to convince a worn and tattered taxpayer to purchase ITS.  The bus is in poor 
condition, with flat tires, a broken headlight, and a hole fixed with duct tape.  Barnett, of the News, portrayed 
ITS‘ equipment as dilapidated.  Barnett, editorial cartoon, ―And It‘s Only Had One Owner,‖ IN, 30 June 1973. 
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Figure 3.  ―End of the Trail‖ The words on the pen read, "RED INK."  Drawn right after the vote to create a 
public transportation corporation, this picture typified how the community viewed ITS.  Werner, editorial 
cartoon, "End of the Trail," IS, 17 August 1973.  
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to keep the system operational.90  ITS‘ bankruptcy required Indianapolis political leaders 
to take on a public service few wanted the government to run.  The language of the 
accepted ordinance reflected the attitude of public transit as a minimal service.  The 
second section justified the creation of urban mass transportation system as ―essential 
to relieve traffic congestion which would otherwise prevent the rapid and efficient 
movement of persons and goods in and about the City, thus interfering with the primary 
purpose of the streets.‖  Section Three established the need for transportation for the 
―proper utilization‖ of commercial, retail and industrial properties.  As almost a final 
thought, the Council inserted that was  
necessary to the welfare of the general public in that it expands the 
economic and social opportunities available to the residents of the City 
and particularly those who…cannot freely move about except through the 
services rendered by an urban mass transportation system.91 
 
The following sections reveal that mass transit would serve to aid automobile travel, not 
encourage balanced transportation or efficient land use.92  In conjunction with earlier 
statements by Wetzel, this final ordinance squarely placed mass transit and transit 
captives as the afterthought of the automobile.  The creation of the public corporation 
was a reaction to the growing concern by politicians and urban residents over transit 
captives and the fragility of Indianapolis‘ aspiration as a first-class city. 
For the African-American community, the process of the creation of the new 
public transit corporation was another instance of the Indianapolis white power structure 
overlooking the needs of the African-American community.  The City-County Council 
records offer little explanation for the Democrat walkout.  The media reported that 
Democrats felt Republicans passed the amendment to reduce the number of board 
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members to close membership of the board to white men.93  Former judge and civil 
rights activist Henry Richardson, Jr. agreed, explaining the purpose of the amendment 
was ―to keep from putting a minority on the operating policy powerful board for 
acquisition and operation of the surface transportation system in this community.‖94  
Lugar and the Council aided this perception when they appointed five white men to the 
new board.  The lack of diversity bothered some politicians.  William Schreiber, chairman 
of the Marion County Democratic Committee, ―criticized the corporation, saying it is not 
representative of those who use buses frequently, such as women, Negroes and elderly 
persons.‖95  Although the five white men might not have presented the perfect 
representation of ridership, the men were well-respected community members who 
could give the new corporation a chance at success.   
Just a few months after denying an ITS fare increase, the PSCI approved one.  
The reason for the reversal was the creation of the new corporation and imminent public 
takeover.  Claffey pleaded bankruptcy before the PSCI and ITS financial data supported 
Claffey‘s claim.  ITS posted nearly a $71,000 operating loss in the month of July alone.  
ITS attorney C. Wendell Martin ―painted a gloomier picture for bus riders, summing up 
the transit firm‘s case saying, ‗If the increase is not granted, I don‘t see how there can 
continue to be bus service in the city.‘‖96  Without ITS operational, public takeover could 
not happen.  This latest request and Indianapolis‘ slow action on public purchase 
frustrated PSCI Chairman W. W. Hill, Jr., who wrote that the new fare was ―‗preferable to 
no bus ride at all.‘‖97  The PSCI declared the increase necessary, even though it 
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promised no additional routes, capital expenditures, or return for the company.98  The 
CAT offered token resistance to the emergency fare increase, understanding that the 
new public corporation needed ITS to be operational.   
Funding proved a problem for the new corporation, the Indianapolis Public 
Transportation Corporation (IPTC).  The IPTC planned its budget based on a 
combination of government monies, fares, and a ten cent property tax in Marion 
County.99  Residents viewed subsidization of mass transit unfavorably.  Respondents to 
a transit attitude survey favored increased user fees (fares) over taxes.  If a tax was 
necessary, a sales tax was the favorite.100  The fact that the respondents felt user fees 
should pay for mass transit indicates both the lack of community support for mass transit 
and a general ignorance of transit financing.  First, the user fee implied the community 
did not want to pay for a service they felt they did not use.  Second, ITS proved user 
fees were inadequate to sustain mass transit.  The price for mobility would have to be 
borne by the entire community. 
The IPTC faced a funding hurdle.  Governor Otis Bowen was cutting property 
taxes by 20 percent statewide and a state tax board had to approve additional increases.  
The board rejected the ten cent property tax increase, instead suggesting that IPTC 
issue bonds to pay for the acquisition, which would still qualify the IPTC for a Federal 
grant.101  The implication for IPTC‘s future was clear.  The requested levy would have 
aided IPTC in their future plans.  The state tax board rejected limited the future financial 
burdens that IPTC could handle.  The state tax board eventually granted only a two and 
one-half cent tax levy, with the rest of the acquisition funded through a temporary capital 
tax levy and a bond issue.  The full levy benefitted IPTC more than it adversely affected 
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taxpayers.  Under the proposed levy, a homeowner of an $18,000 home paid $5 a year, 
but the approved levy required the homeowner to pay only $1.25 annually.  The state tax 
board was comfortable with the IPTC budgeting.  Although the proposal requested 
$7.109 million, IPTC had only budgeted to receive $5,580,295.102  There is little 
explanation for the discrepancy but city and IPTC controller Fred Armstrong felt the two 
and one-half cent property tax increase would adequately fund IPTC.   
The IPTC board realized the long road they faced, and expressed hesitation at 
their operating competency, noting an ―awesome responsibility to provide continuing bus 
service‖ and its ―considerable reluctance‖ in beginning operations.103  Chairman John 
Walls would offer insight into IPTC‘s strategy: ―While we recognize our obligations to 
continue to serve those who have no alternative to riding coaches, the Metro will 
become successful only by increasing ridership, and that means attracting people who 
do have a choice.‖104  The IPTC hoped to revitalize mass transit through modernization 
and aggressive marketing.105  The first step was purchasing ITS, which lingered through 
1974 but finally struck an agreement in late 1974.  The purchase price of ITS ended up 
being $4.5 million dollars.106  UMTA approved the capital grant, ATU 1070 signed off, 
and the IPTC was poised to begin the new system, nicknamed Metro.   
In advocating for public ownership, the community desperately sought to 
distance itself from the philosophies and strategies of ITS.  The constant fare increases 
and service reductions lingered in the memories of riders and transit advocates.  The 
CAT and board members of the IPTC offered hope that public ownership would 
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distinguish itself from those strategies.  Whatever hopes the community harbored for the 
IPTC, the political compromising during the creation of the IPTC curtailed any truth in 
revamping mass transit.  The opportunities available to Metro after 1975 did not match 
the opportunity the Indianapolis community missed in transitioning from private to public 
ownership.  The years from 1973 to 1975 provided the opportunity to alter Indianapolis‘ 
urban transportation system, including creating an extensive mass transportation 
network.  The aggressive comprehensive plan suggested by the GIPC would have 
potentially placed Indianapolis urban transportation at the national forefront in 
coordinated transportation and mass transit.  Implementation of the GIPC plan could 
have sparked urban redevelopment in Indianapolis and reduced the community‘s 
dependence on the automobile.  Instead, the IPTC board faced a perfect storm of 
disinterested local politicians, a statewide property tax increase, and an uninterested 
automobile community.  These factors, combined with the reactionary nature of 
Indianapolis politicians and conservative media, resulted in a minimalist system with little 
chance of meeting the high expectations of the Indianapolis community.  In the end, 
these outside factors forced the local players to negotiate Indianapolis‘ future mobility.   
Metro assumed operating responsibilities on 7 January 1975.107  Public 
ownership of mass transit started in Indianapolis with little media fanfare.  The Star 
made no mention of the transfer of ownership and the News provided minimal coverage.  
The media provided no editorials about the optimistic future of mass transit, no hard-
hitting series on the potential growth under public ownership, and certainly little 
excitement.  The success of Metro hinged on two groups that provided IPTC‘s success 
hinged on two groups: automobile drivers and politicians.  The IPTC could only 
accomplish its goals if it could lure choice riders and if politicians supported it.  Failure to 
sell either group on mass transit would doom IPTC to become what Kohl termed a 
                                                          
107
 Art Harris, ―City-Owned ‗Metro‘ Buses Roll Tomorrow,‖ IN, 6 January 1975, 1. 
88 
 
―skeleton system,‖ fit for only transit captives.  The IPTC faced a difficult task in 
convincing the community to ride mass transit. 
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Chapter Four 
 
―The Metro Muddle‖: Public Ownership in Indianapolis, 1975-1980 
 
 
 The Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation (IPTC) board issued a 
statement in 1973 outlining its creation and responsibility.  In this statement, the Board of 
Directors clearly delineated its primary purpose:  ―It is our full intent to work very closely 
with the City Administration and its Department of Transportation toward the goal of full 
and adequate transportation service for this community.‖1  The IPTC recognized its fiscal 
responsibility was the efficient use of taxpayer dollars to provide adequate 
transportation.  Metro‘s secondary goal was increased ridership by attracting choice 
riders.2  Some of the tasks designed to accomplish these goals were to acquire the 
suburban service providers, maintain the 50 cent fare, decrease headway, and increase 
service.  Metro managers deviated from ITS by pursuing an aggressive marketing 
campaign to achieve their goals.  Metro advertised in newspapers, on the radio, and on 
television, touting the savings and convenience of mass transit.  Transportation experts 
throughout the country heralded the benefits of marketing in resurrecting the stagnant 
industry.  Metro‘s private management firm, American Transit Enterprise (ATE), believed 
in aggressive marketing. 
 Clearly established goals were a prime factor to successful public ownership of 
urban mass transit.  The focus of ATE and the IPTC was service quality and patronage, 
not profits at the expense of service quality.3  A public transit corporation was created for 
public service, not profits, although efficiency should not be abandoned because of 
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limited resources.4  Transit as a public service should serve both transit captives and 
choice riders. 
ATE and the IPTC board believed in the transformative powers of marketing to 
break the vicious cycle, improve its public image, and foster public support.5  Transit 
management possessed few tools to stimulate demand and increase revenues, and 
marketing was the best tool.6  Transit companies could research consumer behavior, 
price competitively, and market the system.7  Lewis Schneider suggested in Marketing 
Urban Mass Transit (1965) that marketing strategy was ―the only strategy…directly 
concerned with the problem of maintaining and stimulating demand.‖8  Marketing was a 
powerful tool to improve IPTC‘s image and its ridership.  Schneider warned that 
management‘s failure would support mass transit as a public service for transit captives 
and ―‗one step below that of the sanitation department.‘‖9  The sentiment of transit as 
nothing more than a vehicle for the poor was exactly what transit advocates and Metro 
administration wanted to avoid; management was key to implementation. 
The deployment of marketing certainly required skilled, creative, and aggressive 
management.  Transit‘s decline left the industry with few young managerial talents, 
leaving most transit agencies with, ―Old style, nonmarketing, nonconsumer-oriented 
managers.‖10  Indianapolis benefitted from their contract to ATE, who combined veteran 
management with new-school aggressiveness and creativity.  Although IPTC General 
Manager William ―Bits‖ Bell was a veteran transit manager, Bell worked for ATE and 
ATE believed strongly in marketing.  Bell combined his numerous decades of transit 
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experience with the new marketing strategies ATE believe could transform mass transit 
under public ownership. 
A new marketing campaign did not ensure immediate success for the IPTC, 
especially with three outside problems confronting the IPTC: adequate funding, 
downtown attraction, and consumer choice.  Inadequate funding could strangle any 
aggressive expansion program.  The temporary nature of grants and political whims 
frustrated managers who needed to make accurate budgets.  The second problem was 
downtown‘s attraction.  Metro managers needed Indianapolis to focus on downtown 
redevelopment to begin to accomplish their goals.  Downtown redevelopment benefitted 
from the long tenures of two Indianapolis mayors – Richard Lugar (1968-1976) and 
William Hudnut III (1976-1992).  Both believed in a strong downtown and committed 
resources to achieve that end.  Successful downtown redevelopment could translate into 
strong ridership growth. 
Marketing provided some hope for the IPTC, but real success came in garnering 
support from consumers and politicians.  A downtown revival in Indianapolis did not 
necessarily equal the IPTC‘s success, especially if public policies continued to support 
automobile usage in downtown areas.11  If politicians refused to support mass transit and 
residents remained in their automobiles, the IPTC could become merely a minimal public 
service. 
Best Bus Forward, 1975-1977 
 For a public transit corporation, the first year is critical to garnering public support 
by reversing transit‘s negative image.12  ―A major necessity in promoting METRO has 
been to dispel the negative stigma placed upon public transportation.  It has been most 
important to enhance and carefully analyze the image of METRO as well as the attitudes 
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of riders and non-riders.‖13  Success depended upon adjusting service to meet 
community expectations, and garnering support from business and political 
communities, civic interest groups, and grassroots supporters.14  Support depended 
upon a greatly improved public image, developed through affordable, timely service. 
 Public ownership brought with it the necessary enthusiasm to revamp its image.  
Contrasted with the plain, uniform annual reports of ITS, Metro‘s first annual report was 
colorful and included a catchy tagline (Figure 4): ―…so when we say that we‘re the time-
savin‘, penny-pinchin‘, fuel-conservin‘, mass-movin‘ METRO machine, we‘re not kidding.  
We‘ve earned the title, and we‘re darned proud of it.‖15  The IPTC developed ambitious 
goals, among them increasing public awareness, offering reliable service, and ―doing the 
best job in the most financially efficient manner.‖16  The IPTC approached the first year 
with optimism, hoping to attract choice riders.  The IPTC employed a multi-faceted plan 
to attract ridership.  First, Metro created a Marketing Department, which created catchy 
slogans and cartoons, introduced a new color scheme and a new company name.  They 
also purchased 60 new coaches to replace the aging fleet.  These tactics distanced the 
IPTC from the unpopular ITS, a great step in reversing transit‘s reputation.17  The 
creative measures attracted industry recognition and were exactly the steps 
contemporary transit experts recommended to revive mass transit.18  The company 
received industry recognition for its efforts.  
The IPTC board estimated that better service, in conjunction with aggressive 
marketing, would also improve its image.  The IPTC restored service curtailed under 
ITS, increased service on existing routes by decreasing headways, and added 10 new 
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Figure 4.  Metro Ad.  Although the author has never heard it, there was a jingle featuring this tagline.  IPTC 
AR 1975, 1, IPTC.   
routes.  Some of the expanded routes served major shopping centers, which proved 
unprofitable under ITS.  Metro could allow the route to develop, especially to areas like 
Lafayette Square and Glendale malls.19  As another step, Metro implemented two 
services designed to aid the elderly and disabled.  The first was Open Door, an on call, 
mini-bus service designed to aid disabled riders.  Fixed labor costs forced Metro to 
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charge a higher fare but Open Door offered door-to-door service.  The second service 
was the Half-Fare program, which provided a reduced fare for the elderly and disabled.  
Half-Fare‘s implementation completed a decade-long fight by the community.20  Emma 
Thompson, director of an organization dedicated to helping elderly residents with 
transportation, remarked, ―METRO has met that need [economic and efficient 
transportation for elderly and handicapped] with better service and a reduced 25 cent 
fare for the elderly and handicapped.‖21  These increased services allowed transit 
captives access to necessary services and reflected an aggressive leadership that was 
committed to better mass transit.  These new and improved services continued to build 
goodwill for the IPTC. 
 These improvements translated into ridership gains, with Metro recording a 
significant ridership increase in 1976.  Bell credited the increases to ―a comprehensive 
marketing and consumer awareness program conducted during this period.‖22  The 
improved situation impressed riders.23  One wrote in a letter to the Star: ―The new Metro 
bus system has helped make Indianapolis a good place in which to live…The drivers are 
courteous, and so are the women who give schedule information by telephone.  I hope 
many people in Indianapolis who have the car habit will try their local Metro lines.‖24  A 
local television station produced a special mass transit report promoting transit as an 
alternative and a way to alleviate congestion and pollution.25  The public image of mass 
transit was improving slowly in Indianapolis, largely as a result of the leadership of the 
IPTC Board and ATE.   
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 Two familiar problems challenged the leadership abilities of Metro.  The first was 
financial.  The aggressive efforts were costly and expenses exceeded expectations.26  
Controller Fred Armstrong observed  
Looking at our financial condition, you will note that our revenues have 
increased approximately three percent (3%) and that our expenses, due 
to a high rate of inflation, have caused a greater increase in subsidy to 
the passenger fare revenues.  Transit systems, in general, are not in a 
profit mode which puts a demand on governmental agencies to subsidize 
and support a public transportation system.27 
 
Armstrong‘s comments on subsidization were expected but the rise in expenses held 
serious consequences for the IPTC.  Higher expenses could mean the curtailment of 
service and, in turn, undermine the effort to revitalize mass transit. 
 The second Metro problem only exacerbated the first.  Metro‘s promising 
ridership gains fell short of expectations.28  Metro projected a 5 to 7 percent increase for 
1975, but only experienced a 4.3 percent increase.  The ―low-gear progress‖ 
disappointed Metro officials, who blamed, in part, Indianapolis residents.29  Bell 
commented, ―Apparently those who said a modern, publicly owned bus service would be 
a great idea really meant it would be a great idea for someone else.‖30  The low ridership 
gains, despite aggressive marketing approaches and media support, indicate the 
community‘s lackluster desire for mass transit. 
The future of Metro rested on the ―willingness of the taxpayers to absorb the 
system‘s losses.‖31  Chairman of the Board Stanley Cederquist noted looming financial 
problems for 1977 and speculated that unless Metro received a ―new and greater 
commitment from our revenue sources,‖ there could be ―highly visible‖ immediate 
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reductions in service and future curtailment.32  Local taxes were the revenue sources 
Cederquist highlighted.  Metro hoped that taxpayers would be amenable to additional 
funds to buttress the low ridership numbers and spiraling operating costs.  The IPTC 
proposed replacing the property tax with a payroll tax, levied on all Marion County 
employees and employers.  The payroll tax would generate greater revenues and assist 
Metro in obtaining a larger federal match.  The outcry of concerned suburban residents 
prevented the payroll tax from gaining steam in 1976.  The failure of the payroll tax once 
again highlighted the political power of suburban interests and the weakness of urban 
politicians to support adequately the IPTC in its attempt to revitalize itself. 
 The major issue in 1976 was the first labor contract between IPTC and Local 
1070.  The two sides could not reach an agreement on the first full contract negotiated 
under public ownership.  As Metro dealt with financial uncertainty, the two sides entered 
binding arbitration.  The decision of the arbitration could determine the trend of labor 
wages for the IPTC and held significant implications for the immediate financial future of 
the IPTC. 
―The Great Heel Flap‖: Labor Relations Under Public Ownership 
 The third year of public ownership started inauspiciously.  An unfortunate state 
error temporarily jeopardized state aid, which threatened federal transit funding, and 
could curtail transit service statewide.33  Government financing compared poorly to 
similarly-sized cities like Louisville and Cincinnati.34  The implications statewide meant a 
quick resolution to the state aid mess, but Metro still needed to save $500,000, as 
operating expenses outpaced operating revenues.  To counteract this trend, Metro cut a 
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service extension phase and reduced headway on some routes, allowing labor cuts 
through attrition. 
 Entering only its third year, Metro started to resemble ITS.  The service cuts were 
exactly what politicians and transit supporters said would be reversed under public 
ownership.  Management hoped the continued service expansion program and 
marketing would reverse the ridership trend and negative image.  Reducing the 
expansion program signaled trouble for Metro.  Clearly, increases in operating expenses 
hampered Metro‘s ambitious plans.  There were bright spots, as Metro opened a new 
downtown service center and introduced a new monthly pass, both intended to provide 
better customer service.35  Challenges presented themselves but Metro still maintained 
its fare despite the financial struggles.  
The media evaluated Metro and wondered, ―The question is not how to make 
Metro fiscally sound but, rather, providing through Metro the mass transit which this city 
needs and letting the general taxpayer help pick up the tab.‖36  Subsidization was a sore 
topic.  Persistent attacks from editorial cartoonists of both local newspapers highlighted 
the subject‘s sensitivity.  Even more damaging was suburban influence over central-city 
decisions.  As Mann noted, ―Furthermore, for Indianapolis to abandon Metro would be a 
blow to its reputation as a city on the move and that, too, would not seem tenable.‖37  
What continued to save IPTC was its integral place in the definition of a successful 
metropolis.   
 One hurdle for IPTC was a new collective bargaining agreement between ATU 
Local 1070 and the IPTC.  Section 13c mandated the continuation of existing bargaining 
rights but the foray into public ownership meant transit workers could no longer strike.38  
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The inability to strike did not hinder Local 1070 because ATU historically encouraged 
arbitration settlements, even before public sector involvement.  The simple reason was 
ATU‘s success in arbitration, accomplished through their philosophy: ―(1) arbitration 
should be used only when it would result in the highest settlement possible; (2) it was 
necessary to clearly define and limit the issues to be arbitrated; and (3) the advocates 
presenting the case should be experts.‖39  ATU‘s philosophy easily trumped 
management, who usually utilized local counsel and rarely cooperated with each other.40  
Simply, ―Management unorganized [was] no match for labor organized.‖41  
 The ATE was anything but unorganized.  Part of their contract included providing 
experienced negotiators for IPTC during contract disputes.  The negotiations in the 
public sector were usually a formality:   
The public manager must respond to two competing pressures.  On one 
side, the workers pressure him to grant large wage increases, while on 
the other, the public pressures him to keep fares low and service up . . . 
the demands of the public are a very important consideration.  The 
manager can solve his dilemma by agreeing to fact finding or arbitration.  
This allows the union to receive a competitive increase and allows the 
manager to direct public ire over a potential fare increase to a third party.  
Likewise, arbitration in particular is an easy way out for union negotiators. 
They can pass unreasonably high demands to please their members and 
direct blame for the ―low‖ settlement on the arbitrator.  Arbitration is also 
usually preferred to a strike, since it is normally less costly to union 
members, does not alienate the public against the union, and does not 
result in the permanent decline in passengers (and hence transit jobs) 
that often occurs after a strike.42 
 
Arbitration prevented costly strikes that could adversely affect a community.43  Being the 
first real arbitration, these hearings had serious implications for the future of public 
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ownership.  They also provide a rare glimpse into the working relationship between 
Local 1070 and management.44 
A rare incident of public visibility came from a newspaper article.  For driver 
safety, Bell limited heel thickness to one inch for drivers.  The union took exception and 
Bell‘s order became a contentious issue.  Management exacerbated the issue when 
during a board meeting, ―Byrum [IPTC general counsel] told Jackson [Local 1070 
president] he was ‗naïve‘ and his compliant over heel thickness was ‗frivolous‘ and then 
delivered a parting shot to Jackson by saying, ‗See you at the shoe store.‘  By this time 
Jackson was crimson.‖45  The relationship between the young Jackson and veteran Bell 
had consequences for the firm. 
The animosity clearly had consequences in regard to industrial relations because 
a tense working relationship increased the likelihood of arbitration instead of a contract 
negotiation.46  Negotiations were an exercise in futility.  Major concessions by 
management seemed unlikely with Metro‘s fiscal situation in flux.  Union workers, 
however, wanted wages comparable to other transit properties.  Local 1070 wanted a 
major pay increase, plus a long list of other additional concessions from the IPTC.  The 
IPTC countered with several demands of its own, including several work rules changes.  
Local 1070 would not subsidize mass transit operations by taking pay cuts or sacrificing 
benefits.47  As Barnum pointed out, the negotiations became an exercise in extremes, 
leading to binding arbitration. 
Binding arbitration involved an impartial judge rendering a binding decision.  The 
two sides choose representatives and then those representatives choose the final 
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arbitrator, who also chaired the proceedings.  Arbitration proceedings maintained 
courtroom formality.  During the proceedings, each side presented an opening 
argument, rebuttals, and then a closing statement.  The chair‘s role was to maintain 
decorum and settle procedural questions.  The board‘s decision was final.  In the case of 
Indianapolis, the IPTC chose John Dash and the union chose I.J. Gromfine.  Dash and 
Gromfine chose Lewis Gill as the chair.48  All three men were well-respected arbitrators 
and familiar with the issues of publicly owned systems. 
 In their opening arguments, each side delineated their demands.  Among their 
demands, the union emphasized wage raises (75 cents every 6 months) and a better 
cost-of-living escalator.49  Management emphasized changing numerous work rules and 
altering the existing wage scale progression as important cost-saving mechanisms.  
Wages and the cost-of-living escalator had the greatest implications.  For union drivers, 
the proposed semi-annual wage increases and cost-of-living adjustment meant a better 
real wage.50  Gromfine reflected on ITS‘ struggles and its impact on the union.  
Decreased service meant fewer union members and lower compensation compared to 
similar industries, like trucking.51  For the IPTC, increases meant a greater financial 
responsibility.  In rebuttal, management put Indianapolis‘ situation in perspective.  Now 
under public ownership, the IPTC struggled to balance the existing budget.  The 
community, IPTC representatives argued, wanted no part of additional subsidization of 
IPTC.  Any concessions by management would require either subsidization or efficiency 
cuts, neither which were viewed positively by Indianapolis residents. 
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 The arbitration continued for several days, involving hundreds of exhibits.  For 
the most part, the proceedings consisted of debating over comparative methodology.  
Each side presented evidence that supported its argument or counter argument.  Since 
transit was a monopolistic industry, arbiters used the top operators‘ wages nationally for 
comparison.  Arbiters might utilize one group of transit systems, while another argued 
the same point but with a completely different group of transit systems, coming to a 
different conclusion.  The union used intra-industry comparisons of comparable cities to 
Indianapolis while Dash, at times, used local wages of closely-related industries or a 
slightly different national sample.52  How each side used their comparables, including 
their methodology, determined the outcome of labor negotiations.  As such, debates 
over methodology were contentious and evoked strong emotions from both sides.   
Hostility brewed throughout the negotiations.  For example, John Dash presented 
IPTC‘s problem with absenteeism before and after key holidays.  IPTC hoped to solve 
the problem by preventing employees from taking sick days around key holidays without 
a doctor‘s note.  The union vehemently denied an absenteeism problem, and Dash 
quipped, ―Put away your fiddle, and let me say something.‖53  A better example of the 
tense relationship occurred the following day, when Bell and the union representatives 
debated about the inclusion of secretaries in the collective bargaining unit.  Bell 
expressed that secretaries should be excluded and Jackson retorted, ―Everybody 
should, is that right?  Everybody should be that way, is that right?‖54  Jackson‘s 
explosion represented his frustration towards management that he considered apathetic 
towards his union.   
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Revelation of the working relationship aside, for the most part, experienced 
professionals conducted the actual arbitration hearings.  The bottom line in the hearings 
was that Indianapolis wages lagged behind similarly-sized cities.55  Company 
representative John Dash pleaded, ―You can‘t spend what you don‘t have and the 
money is not available to continue what exists today.  This is a fact.‖56  Typical transit 
labor negotiations favored the more centralized and organized labor unions.  IPTC 
benefitted from the involvement of ATE, combined with the former ITS managers, 
brought more balance to the negotiations.  The ruling had the potential to hinder the 
plans to restore mass transit as an alternative in Indianapolis.   
 As the arbitration concluded, the IPTC reintroduced the payroll tax to reinvigorate 
the struggling corporation.  IPTC‘s persistence for the payroll tax was due to the lack of 
available options.  IPTC had maintained fares to help pay for expansion, tax rates were 
frozen, and the county option tax was a political nonstarter.  Metro explained that a 30 
percent cut in service would be necessary without the payroll tax.  The Chamber of 
Commerce first suggested the payroll tax, ―as a means of building a good working 
balance in Metro‘s budget for the next few years, even though the immediate needs are 
for less than the $2.2 million the 30 cent rate will bring.‖57  The payroll tax also drew 
additional support from the Coalition of Adequate Transportation, Deputy Mayor 
Hasbrook, and Yellow Cab. 
 The conservative Star opposed and argued that taxing companies would 
increase costs on goods and services within Marion County.  Additionally, the Star found 
no equality in taxing out-of-county residents, who saw little benefit of the taxes.58  The 
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Star cartoonist, never missing an opportunity to lampoon the bus company, penned 
another cartoon over Metro‘s woes.59  The Star’s comments undermined mass transit as 
a public service while offering no alternative to a public mass transit company.  The 
constant conservative commentary presented a significant hurdle for obtaining additional 
financial support. 
 Metro‘s financial situation became more tenuous with the decision by the 
arbitration board.  Local 1070 was awarded $483,000 in unbudgeted wages and 
benefits, which were 7 to 8 percent higher than 1977.60  The award signaled a victory for 
organized labor even if the increases were less than union negotiators requested.  Metro 
achieved minor victories, including the reduction of wages for new hires.61  The labor 
negotiations result benefited union members, even if they did not receive all their 
demands.  Increased benefits and wages meant Metro managers needed to squeeze 
more service from fewer dollars.  The new labor contract provisions limited the funding 
impact of the payroll tax.   
Even if the payroll passed, Metro would need an additional funding source after 
1978 to continue expansion.62  Unexpected cost increases, in conjunction with lower 
than expected ridership numbers, quickly hampered the optimism surrounding Metro.  
Parts of the private and public sector supported the payroll tax.  The News supported the 
payroll tax as well but observed that, ―With a future financial crisis guaranteed, Metro 
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has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.‖63  The decision by the State Tax Board to limit the 
funding of Metro had proved catastrophic but the Star laid the blame on management:  
There surely ought to be a promising future for mass transit in this thriving 
and growing community.  The promise lies in luring more people away 
from the convenience of their increasingly costly private automobiles.  
Metro managers have taken some measures to try to do that, and with 
some success.  They should keep trying.64   
 
Suburban residents and legislators agreed.  Both blasted the measure as taxation 
without representation and letters to both Indianapolis newspapers reflected that 
attitude.65 Despite support from a broad spectrum of Indianapolis groups, the payroll tax 
fizzled. 
 Although public officials argued unfamiliarity with the new tax was the reason for 
its failure, a newspaper report revealed an alternative story.  Art Harris‘ sources revealed 
that suburban politicians threatened to prevent any Marion County legislation from 
passing in the State General Assembly if the City-County Council passed the payroll 
tax.66  The News denounced the caving of urban politicians to suburban pressures and 
tied the success of mass transit to the success of the city.  State Senator Julia Carson 
agreed and called for reconsideration for transit captives.67  The same editorial 
commented: ―Logic suffered at the hands of political expediency, ignorance…and 
indecisive leadership.‖68  Mayor Hudnut was likely the ―indecisive leadership‖ cited in the 
News editorial.  Hudnut waited until after the vote to voice his opposition, calling the tax 
an administrative nightmare.69  The defeat of the payroll tax was another defeat in the 
growing number of frustrations for the IPTC. 
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 Metro‘s financial issues remained.  Reacting, the Star editorial board focused on 
finding alternative funding and lamented Metro‘s service cuts.  Just shortly after 
opposing the payroll tax, the Star commented, ―If the need for additional aid is as urgent 
as it has been said to be, the city should look hard for a reasonable way to meet it.‖70  
With few options, Metro even placed flyers on their buses, pleading for riders to lobby 
their councilmen.71  Another alternative could have been concessions on recently won 
wages and benefits.  Thomas Jackson responded: ―At no time [should] you think this 
union is going to subsidize the operational costs.‖72  Despite Hudnut‘s opposition to the 
payroll tax, he promised city funds to cover the operating deficit.  The City-County 
Council delivered on his promise, sending $250,000 in federal revenue sharing dollars.73  
The News was encouraged by Metro‘s progress but noted that the amount provided was 
a temporary solution.74  For mass transit to be successful, funding needed to be 
adequate and stable. 
The Metropolitan Development Commission (MDC) and the GIPC hoped 
upgrades would encourage ridership and prompt better funding.  In an updated 
thoroughfare plan, the MDC called for $38 million in transit upgrades, including express 
bus routes.75  Metro planned for the future as well, which led them to offering an 
unlimited monthly ride ticket, with the idea to sell employers on the monthly pass.  The 
employers would in turn sell the tickets at a reduced rate to employees, further 
encouraging mass transit.76 
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The future did not seem as bright as it did just two years earlier.  The momentum 
and optimism during the initial months of public ownership quickly faded as ridership 
numbers failed to meet expectations and deficits soared.  The IPTC encountered annual 
fights over financing, largely losing due to the increased political power of wealthy 
commuting suburbanites who were unwilling to pay for the new public service.  State 
Senator John Mutz (R-Indianapolis) seemed to strike the heart of the matter when he 
noted, ―This city has an obligation to keep the present bus system fiscally sound 
because we will need a viable system in the future.‖77  Public transit was not ―now,‖ but 
maybe could be tomorrow.  The IPTC should be maintained, not expanded, reflecting 
the apathy of the community towards transit, a result of two factors: the automobile 
culture and the poor public image developed by the private owners, ITS especially. 
Frustrated Fight, 1978-1980 
 Three numbers illustrated the tumultuous first five years of public ownership: 
13,554,499; 51,932; $1,172,778.  The first number is 1978 ridership.  Metro added 
613,405 riders from 1975 to 1978, a meager number considering the company‘s 
aggressive plans.  The second number is daily ridership in 1978 – nearly 6,000 more 
daily riders than in 1975.  This number indicated a growing regular ridership, a positive 
sign.  The third number is far more revealing.  After federal and local assistance, the loss 
in 1978 was $1,172,778, slightly higher than the $870,687 recorded in 1975.78  The 
numbers were not as positive as hoped and it was largely a result of unexpected cost 
increases and politicians‘ refusal to pass the payroll tax because of suburban pressure.  
Metro remained unfazed and continued its improvements.  They introduced a successful 
route connecting IUPUI and downtown, funded in part by downtown merchants.79  Metro 
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continued its marketing efforts but there were critics.80  Governor Bowen‘s transportation 
advisor, William Watt, critiqued the advertising job of Metro up to 1978, commenting that 
IPTC was doing a rotten job and that the optimism and promises of the development of 
mass transit in the 1970s was nothing but hot air.81  Metro struggled and reintroduced 
the payroll idea in mid-1978.  Hudnut and the Star opposed the proposed tax, as 
evidenced by Figure 5.82 
 The 1978 payroll tax proposal occurred before a 1979 oil shortage that forced 
Indianapolis to promote transit use, briefly quieting the opposition of the payroll tax.  The 
energy shortage caused a transit ridership hike nationwide.  In cities like Chicago, New 
York, and Philadelphia, riders jam-packed subways and buses.  A dearth of investment 
in mass transit had left the equipment old and transit companies were overwhelmed by 
the demand created by the oil shortage.  There was an adequate amount of buses in 
reserve in case of a ridership jump for Metro.  Indianapolis made its own case for 
increased investment with a 6 percent ridership gain over 1978.83   
 Some notable changes occurred near the end of 1979.  Bell left Metro and was 
replaced by the much younger Robert Lorah.  Bell‘s lost experience could be 
compensated for by ATE‘s structure.84  Second, the Metro board attempted to redefine 
monthly pass revenue as local funding, in an attempt to obtain additional federal 
funding.85  The tactic failed but showed the lengths with which Metro went to obtain 
additional funding for the system.  Third, Metro learned that a zoo, part of a new state 
park, would replace its existing facilities.  It was an ambitious plan to reinvigorate 
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downtown.  The plan included no funds for a replacement facility.  Metro would be 
moved and become homeless.86 
 
Figure 5.  ―Piggyback!‖  Another editorial cartoon opposing the idea of a publicly owned bus system, sparked 
by new calls for a payroll tax.  IS, 7 June 1978. 
 Over 14 million passengers enjoyed Metro‘s services in 1979, a 4.1 percent 
increase over 1978.87  Metro‘s popularity became a problem as riders overwhelmed 
existing buses.  Increased peak hour passengers meant the increased possibility of 
standing riders, or ―straphangers.‖88  Metro essentially shrugged off the many customer 
complaints: ―We‘re going to have a whole new generation of straphangers in 
Indianapolis.‖89  Straphangers were common in the heyday of mass transit and 
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contemporary executives considered them an indication of prosperity.  For choice riders, 
strap hanging was intolerable and compared poorly to the comforts of the automobile.  
Indianapolis residents, accustomed to their own automobile, would likely not continue to 
ride mass transit if they could not find a seat.  Metro‘s success prompted calls for an 
expanded mass transit system, including light rail.  The national outlook on rail transit 
splashed water on those ideas.90  Rail transit programs were struggling across the 
United States and these struggles were highly publicized.  Recent successes aside, the 
Indianapolis sentiment remained wary of mass transit. 
Into the Future 
The first five years of public ownership provided a roller coaster ride for those 
involved.  For five years, Metro management faced one problem after another while  
managing to build slowly a ridership base in Indianapolis.  The future looked bleak.   
Metro could not muster enough political support for a needed revenue boost and 
expenses climbed faster than projections, a sure recipe for future financial crises.  
Table 2 below displays the quantitative successes and struggles Metro 
experienced during the first five years of public ownership.  Metro‘s passenger count 
increased by nearly 2.1 million riders annually while expenses nearly doubled.  Only 
through subsidies could Metro continue to operate buses around Indianapolis.  
Statistically, it seemed as though Metro was a mixture of success and failure.  
Metro underwent several changes between 1980 and 2007, but ridership and 
funding issues remained.  The construction of the Indianapolis Zoo in the White River 
State Park forced ITS to move its headquarters.  Metro‘s equipment replacement 
program continued until 1987, when the company took a ten-year hiatus largely as a  
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Table 2.  IPTC Operating Statistics, 1975 to 1980.  Information obtained from IPTC AR 1975-1980. 
result of funding problems.  Despite the issues with funding, Metro maintained a 
reasonable fare level, with fares reaching $1.75 in 2007.  Changing political winds  
brought the idea of privatization.  Stephen Goldsmith became mayor in 1991 and 
decided to shake up the system.  He replaced its attorney, the chairman of the board, 
and several board members.  ―In three years all pre-takeover managers and key support 
people were gone, along with their expertise.‖91  IPTC had fallen into a rut but the lost 
operational knowledge of former ITS managers and support staff could not easily be 
replaced.  The replacements provided limited improvement, although Metro experienced 
its first passenger increase in a decade in 1994.92   
 Goldsmith hogtied Metro further when he persuaded state lawmakers to divert 
Metro‘s portion of the state sales tax dedicated to transit to Indianapolis.  Metro needed 
to bid for everything but heaviest weekday routes.  Goldsmith expected this bidding 
strategy to force Metro to become thrifty.  Local 1070 recognized a dire situation and 
agreed to a new contract that froze wages for three years and offered early retirement 
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Year Passengers Revenues Expenses (Loss) before 
local and 
federal 
assistance 
Net (loss) 
1975 12,941,094 $5,554,312 $7,780,683 ($2,857,952) ($870,687) 
1976 13,271,933 $5,718,273 $9,402,205 ($4,650,014) ($1,382,063) 
1977 13,242,745 $5,619,024 $9,799,831 ($5,251,726) ($1,061,246) 
1978 13,554,499 $5,885,944 $10,643,660 ($5,863,693) ($1,172,778) 
1979 14,089,501 $6,217,637 $12,119,867 ($6,886,489) ($1,430,178) 
1980 15,022,585 $6,137,428 $13,996,680 ($8,840,388) ($852,885) 
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that 50 employees accepted.  Metro won but a new agency was created to oversee all 
transportation operations.  The organization set out to revamp Metro, including a new 
name: IndyGo.  The major revamping sparked public outrage when the plans hit the 
media.  Indianapolis scrapped everything but the new name.  Goldsmith‘s privatization 
efforts subsided in 1999 and all privatized routes folded back under the IPTC.  The IPTC 
still operates today, although ATE no longer manages the system.   
David Miller captured the essence of Metro in one simple phrase: ―By now it was 
a matter of coping with a mixture of growth and decline.‖93  This did not have to be the 
case.  Portland, Oregon found success in their Smart Growth strategy, increasing 
transit‘s visibility, accessibility, and commuter share.94  Public management in 
Indianapolis tried every conceivable tactic to obtain political and financial support.  
Conservative politics and media in Indianapolis, however, discouraged increased mass 
transit investment while encouraging downtown investment.  Paltry private sector 
support between 1975 and 2009 has hampered efforts to improve mass transit.  These 
outside factors contributed to the erosion of the fresh optimism of Metro and the 
continued marginalization of mass transit in Indianapolis.   
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Conclusion 
 
“Transit is identified as the transportation of the poor, the black, and the 
Hispanic.  Transit is not part of the American dream; it is not viewed as 
the transportation for the upwardly mobile.”1 
-- George Smerk, 1991 
 
 Public ownership of mass transit is an overlooked, but important piece, of the 
changing cultural and social trends in postwar America.  The purchase was recognition 
that mass transportation was a necessary public service; no resident should be deprived 
of that civil right.  Grassroots movements recognized the crisis of mass transit and 
pleaded for government action but it was only when urban planners and engineers 
published reports that civic leaders responded to the crisis by purchasing ailing transit 
companies.  These new public corporations rarely received adequate money to revive 
mass transit but the purchase saved mass transit  
In general, transportation experts considered public ownership a failure of 
expectations.  George Hilton, a persistent UMTA opponent, concluded ten years after its 
passage that the federal program failed to generated expected externalities, especially 
increased mobility for transit captives.2  Fare decreases meant to encourage ridership 
contributed to spiraling deficits but failed to boost ridership significantly.3  Pucher blamed 
the federal subsidy formula and declining labor productivity and rising labor costs.4  
According to Hilton, the failure was a result of a misinterpretation of transit‘s decline, a 
criticism shared by most scholars.  This misinterpretation maintained the protection of 
work rules in the transit industry, a protection guaranteed by UMTA.  Subsidies propped 
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up an industry that needed an overhaul, not an infusion of federal money predicated on 
maintaining a self-defeating status quo.  The cost-benefit analysis applied to UMTA 
suggested that program was a failure – high operating deficits, few new riders, and the 
failure to diminish certain externalities. 
George Smerk challenged economists who dismissed the federal program as a 
failure based upon cost benefit analysis.  Smerk argued that applying the cost benefit 
analysis to transit was ill-conceived, especially considering factors outside transit‘s 
control that encouraged suburbanization and automobile dependence.5  Federal policy, 
and public ownership, failed to transform transit‘s image, continuing the perception of 
transit, especially exclusively bus systems, as transportation of the poor and not the 
upwardly mobile.6  Localities failed to redefine the image of transit, to increase 
substantially the number of transit riders, and to reshape American cities. 
Smerk placed the blame squarely on the failure of public transportation 
corporations to transform transit‘s image and create good will in the community.  With 
the eradications of Federal operating subsidies under Reagan, the firms required more 
local assistance.  Even with the subsidies and aggressive marketing campaigns, the 
industry failed to ―institutionalize transit as a vital part of the community.‖7  Communities 
remained tied to the notion of transit as a private, for-profit service that should rely on 
user fees not local subsidies.8  Judgment on UMTA is then a matter of perspective; 
UMTA preserved transit systems, raised public awareness, and provided new hardware 
and fixed facilities.9  While Smerk remained hopeful that mass transit could eventually 
become an alternative, he recognized that the statistics for the federally funded ―revival‖ 
of mass transit indicated a clear policy failure. 
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Historians were just as pessimistic about UMTA‘s results and the future of public 
transportation in the United States.  Glenn Yago criticized the federal subsidy formula, 
limited subsidization, and the hidden expense of highways in The Decline of Transit 
(1984).10  The fare growth and ridership decline in the 1980s concerned Yago, who 
pointed towards increased automobile reliance as reason for a decline in transit 
investment and opposition to transit subsidies.11  Yago believed balanced transportation 
was the recipe for a healthy urban environment and considered transit part of the 
solution for infrastructure and mobility problems.12 
The most recent discussion of public ownership occurred in Mass Motorization 
and Mass Transit (2008), written by David Jones, Jr.  His discussion of public ownership 
is quite extensive.  He concluded that,  
With hindsight, we can say that public ownership and reinvestment were 
necessary but insufficient to restore transit‘s competiveness.  Missing was 
any serious effort to reorganize street transit in the process of its 
conversion to public ownership. . . Federal funding made a soft landing 
possible for transit, but the decades that followed have produced neither 
vigorous recovery of central city ridership nor a broadly based increase in 
transit rides per capita or transit‘s commute share.13 
 
Jones laid his criticism directly upon the misinterpretation by the government of the 
causes of transit‘s decline.  Instead of tackling the fare structure, work rules, and service 
mix, Congress appropriated money towards capital expenditures and guaranteed the 
preservation of work rules under Section 13c.  Public ownership failed to attract 
significant ridership gains and Jones highlighted four specific reasons for its failure: 
Gains in market share have proved elusive for four primary reasons.  One 
is that federal policy was premised on the historically faulty proposition 
that transit‘s difficulties were the result of unbalanced public policy, a 
premise that ignored the many forms of obsolescence that plagued the 
transit industry by 1945 and the financial difficulties it had experienced 
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since World War I.  Another reason that gains in market share have 
proven elusive is that the population of the central cities has declined both 
in absolute terms and as a share of the national population.  The third 
reason is that the sunbelt‘s share of the national population has 
increased, while the share of the population that lives in the frostbelt‘s 
transit-oriented industrial centers has declined sharply.  The fourth reason 
is that increasing women‘s participation in the workforce has enabled an 
increasing number of households to afford both a second car and a 
suburban home.  For all of those reasons, public ownership and federal 
investment have been unable to produce any broadly based or sustained 
increase in either transit rides per capita or transit commute share.14 
 
Jones‘ conclusion matched those of Pucher, Yago, and Smerk.  Jones placed the blame 
on Congressional zeal and changing social and cultural trends; transit management held 
little blame in Jones‘ text.  In fact, Jones placed transit managers as victims rather than 
ineffective actors.  The statement that resounds from Jones was that, ―The unfortunate 
consequence is that transit‘s conversion to public ownership was missed as an 
opportunity to modernize and reorganize public transportation in more than cosmetic 
ways.‖15  Jones‘ analysis kept the historiography of public ownership nearly consistent.  
Public ownership prevented an industry from near eradication but fell short of all 
Congressional expectations.   
 
The most important characteristic of public ownership was the sustainability of 
mass transit.  An existing bus system could be the groundwork for a larger transit revival 
when public consciousness about energy use, land use or a combination of either 
increased to a point that the community considered a more balanced transportation 
network, including a comprehensive mass transit system.  Indianapolis residents 
expected an expanded system, a system that emphasized residential mobility, not 
shareholder profitability.  In some ways, the public system met those expectations.  New 
buses, new bus shelters and expanded routes were a direct result of the influence of 
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public subsidies.  The injection of public monies failed to overturn the status quo of mass 
transit in Indianapolis.  Initial success met with increased costs and little community 
support, especially in regards to higher subsidies.  The IPTC did not develop the 
community support necessary to convince politicians to increase its subsidy.  Continued 
automobile ownership and population dispersal hurt IPTC ridership numbers.  By 2007, 
annual ridership was only 10 million, a loss in annual ridership of 5 million since 1980. 
Public ownership was a failed attempt at creating an urban identity.  Indianapolis 
politicians and residents passed up the opportunity to redefine their urban area and their 
identity, much as Atlanta tried to do with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority 
(MARTA).16  Politicians disregarded the benefits of an expanded mass transit system, 
despite evidence from their own studies, instead continuing to rely on the personal 
convenience of the automobile.17  Indianapolis politicians, especially then Mayor Richard 
Lugar, were trying to create an identity for Indianapolis.  Lugar‘s administration realized 
Indianapolis would lose national credibility without universal mobility.  Mass transit was 
part of the identity of a major metropolitan area in the United States. 
The decline of the private mass transit corporation provided the opportunity for 
an informed public discussion on Indianapolis‘ transportation future.  The media 
attention, combined with myriad of government studies, allowed Indianapolis residents 
the opportunity to become more acquainted with the complex issue of urban 
transportation.  Political apathy and little public will resulted in a squandered opportunity 
and the continuation of mass transit in Indianapolis as a skeleton system. 
The blame for mass transit‘s failure to transform itself could lay on the early 
opportunities for municipalities.  Streetcar companies struggled with high debt loads but 
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ridership was high and companies would have required little subsidy.18  The prevailing 
laissez-faire economic theory and anti-socialist sentiment led to a very outspoken 
opposition to public ownership in the early part of the twentieth century.  Forced public 
ownership characterized the period between 1950 and 1980 and, with some exceptions, 
systems created during this period, despite high expectations, have hardly increased 
transit‘s commute share.19   
 A growing public consciousness of the disenfranchised manifested itself in public 
ownership and subsequent decisions by the public corporation.  Discounted fares for 
senior citizens, Dial-A-Ride and the federal requirement for handicapped accessible 
buses are all reflections of the heightened social awareness of the rights of the 
disenfranchised.  Private owners faced little market pressure to enact any of these 
changes.  In Indianapolis‘ case, the state regulatory agency protected the private transit 
company from having to provide reduced fares for the disabled and the elderly. 
Public ownership became part of the tail-end of a national movement for urban 
revival.  Using a public-private partnership, the program sought to remove blight areas 
and revive downtown areas.  Indianapolis achieved a considerable amount of success in 
its downtown revival program, mainly through the construction of a downtown shopping 
center, multiple sports arenas and an urban university.  Indianapolis has continued to 
grow, but mainly on the periphery in places like Zionsville, Carmel, Noblesville and 
Fishers.  The continued sprawl of Indianapolis has hindered Metro‘s ability to sustain or 
grow ridership numbers.  The success of downtown Indianapolis indicates that a 
comprehensive mass transit system is unnecessary for downtown revival.  
Labor‘s relative invisibility in Indianapolis is a consequence of few primary 
documents, not its influence.  Nationally, organized labor leveraged its significant 
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political influence within the industry to include labor protection in the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964.  Public corporations needed organized labor‘s approval prior 
to obtaining federal monies.  The absence of a highly publicized labor opinion in the 
media could reflect the local‘s disorganization or inability to muster public opinion.  The 
power of the national unions covered the stumbling of the local chapter and allowed 
labor to obtain wage concessions from management.  In the case of Indianapolis, 
significant financial restraints of the system did not prevent the arbiter from awarding 
labor some of their demands.  Labor‘s role in the transition is unquestionable.  
Organized labor fought successfully for continuing the rights won under private 
ownership. 
 ITS management deviated from the generalized notion of incompetent 
management.  Frederick Johnson and his techniques sustained mass transit in 
Indianapolis years after other transit companies in similarly sized cities failed.  His 
techniques left the Indianapolis public with old, but well-maintained buses and facilities, 
which allowed for gradual replacement instead of a wholesale replacement.  The 
community criticized ITS management for being conservative but their business 
techniques allowed the IPTC to inherit a well-maintained fleet and good facilities. 
Circumstances forced political decisions to purchase ITS but the decision 
reflected the growing political consciousness about the community‘s responsibility to the 
disenfranchised.  Handicapped, the elderly and the poor required transportation but 
lacked access to the automobile; these population segments necessitated mass transit 
as a public service.  Politicians disliked subsidizing a historically private enterprise 
relying on user fees.  The general community refused to consider mass transit a public 
service, continuing to utilize the term ―deficit‖ and becoming outraged when the 
enterprise does not breakeven. 
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 Public ownership is a microcosm of historical changes in twentieth-century 
America.  A once proud industry was a victim of nearly every major event in post-war 
America.  The increase of public sector unionism, inflation, automobile dominance, 
suburbanization, increased federal spending, and the decline of the central city all 
greatly impacted transit.  The failure of public ownership to redefine urban transportation 
was a missed opportunity for Indianapolis and many other American cities.  The new 
public corporations provided a usable service for urban residents and continued the 
necessary service.  The recognition of transportation as a civil right, requiring subsidy, is 
the legacy of public ownership. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Absenteeism – unjustified failure to report to work when scheduled.20 
 
Arbitration – a method of settling disputes between labor and management through 
recourse to an impartial third party, whose decision is usually final and binding.21 
 
Bargaining — 
 Collective – negotiation between an employer and union representatives usually 
on wages, hours, and working conditions. 
 Joint – the negotiation of an agreement between two or more unions and a 
single employer.22 
 
Bargaining right – the legally recognized right of a union to represent workings in 
dealings with employers.23 
 
Captive transit rider – a person who does not have immediate access to private 
transportation or who otherwise must use public transportation in order to 
travel.24 
 
Cost-of-living allowance – a regular increase in employee‘s‘ wages or salaries made 
on the basis of an escalator clause or other agreement.25 
 
Disadvantaged, transportation – people whose range of transportation alternatives is 
limited, especially in the availability of relatively easy-to-use and inexpensive 
alternatives for trip making, e.g., the young, the elderly, the poor, the 
handicapped, and those who do not have automobiles.26 
 
Escalator clause – a provision in a labor agreement that stipulates that wages are to be 
automatically increased or reduced periodically according to a schedule related 
to changes in the cost of living as measured by a designated index or other 
standard, e.g., average earnings; may also apply to any tie between employee 
benefits and the cost of living, as in a pension plan.27 
 
Expenses— 
 Operating – the cost of maintaining property and conducting transportation and 
incidental services, including accrued depreciation.28 
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 Transportation – cost of drivers‘ wages, wages and salaries of other employees 
in the transportation department, motor fuel and oil costs (exclusive of taxes), 
and tolls for the use of highways, bridges, tunnels, and ferries.29  
 
Fare – the authorized payment for a ride on a passenger vehicle, whether cash, token, 
transfer, or pass. 
 Average – the arithmetic average of all fares paid by all passengers, including 
those who received special or reduced fares. 
 Basic – the one-zone fare with no discounts, i.e., what it costs an adult paying a 
single cash fare to take a one-zone ride. 
 Reduced – a special fare for children, students, senior citizens, or others that is 
less than the regular fare.30 
 
Fringe benefit – a supplement to a worker‘s wages or salary that is paid for by the 
employer, e.g., paid vacations, pensions, health and life insurance plans.31 
 
Grievance – any complaint or dissatisfaction expressed by an employee in connection 
with his job, pay, or other aspect of his employment.32 
 
Grievance procedure – a formal plan specified in a labor agreement that provides a 
channel for the adjustment of grievances through discussions at progressively 
higher levels of authority in the company and the union, usually culminating in 
arbitration if necessary; formal procedures may also be provided in nonunion 
companies, but there is no union to represent the workers.33 
 
Headway – the spatial distance of time interval between the front ends of vehicles 
moving along the same lane or track in the same direction. 
 Base – the scheduled time between transit vehicle trips during an off-peak 
(usually midday) period.34 
 
Marketing – the performance of business activities that directs the flow of goods and 
services from producer to consumer or user.35 
 
Mediation (conciliation) – an attempt by a third party to help in negotiations or in the 
settlement of a dispute between an employer and a union through suggestions, 
advice, or other ways of fostering agreement short of dictating its provisions (a 
characteristic of arbitration); most of the mediation in the United States is 
undertaken through federal and state mediation agencies.36 
 
Off peak – a period of day or night during which travel activity is generally low and a 
minimum of transit service is operating.37 
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Operator – an employee of a transit system who spends his or her workday in the 
operation of a vehicle, e.g., bus driver, streetcar motorman, trolley coach 
operator, cable car gripman, rapid transit train motorman, and conductor.38 
 
Paratransit – forms of public transportation services that are more flexible and 
personalized than conventional fixed-route, fixed-schedule service but not 
including such exclusory services as charter bus and exclusive-ride taxi; vehicles 
are usually available to the public on demand, by subscription, or on a shared-
ride basis.39 
 
Park and ride (park ‗n‘ ride) – a procedure that permits a patron to drive a private 
automobile to a transit station, park in the area provided for that purpose, and 
ride the transit system to his or her destination.40 
 
Passenger – a person who rider a transportation vehicle, excluding the driver or the 
crew members of a public transportation vehicle 
 Revenue – a passenger from whom a fare is collected 
 Transfer – a passenger who transfers to a line or route after paying a fare on 
another line or route. 
 
Patronage – the number of transit passengers carried during a given time period.41 
 
Peak – the hours, usually in the morning or afternoon, when demand for transportation 
service is heaviest.42 
 
Peak hour – that hour during which the maximum amount of travel occurs; may be 
specified as the morning peak hour or the afternoon or evening peak hour or as 
both combined.43 
 
Productivity – the ratio of unites of output to units of input, e.g., vehicle-kilometers per 
operator-hour.44 
 
Ratio — 
 Operating – the ratio of operating expenses to operating revenue.45 
 
Revenue — 
 Federal operating assistance – funds obtained from the federal government to 
assist in paying the cost of operating transit services.46 
 Local operating assistance – funds obtained from local government units to 
assist in paying the cost of operating transit services, excluding assistance-in-
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kind and forgiven indebtedness but including grants and reimbursements for 
general operating assistance, demonstration project assistance, fare subsidies, 
tax payments, and interest payments. 
 Regular passenger – revenue received from regular passenger operations, 
including special fare subsidies received to make up reduced fares (e.g., for 
school children or senior citizens) but excluding revenue received from charter 
operations. 
 State operating assistance – funds obtained from one or more state 
governments to assist in paying the cost of operating transit services, excluding 
assistance-in-kind and forgiven indebtedness.47 
 
Reverse commute – movement from a residence to a place of employment in a 
direction opposite to the main flow of traffic, such as from the central city to a 
suburb.48 
 
Rider – a passenger on any revenue-service vehicle. 
 Captive – a person limited by circumstances to use one mode of transportation 
 Captive transit – a person who does not have a private vehicle available or 
cannot drive for any reason and who must use public transportation in order to 
travel. 
 Choice – a rider who has a variety of modes of travel available and selects one 
to use.49 
 
Ridership – the number of persons using a transit system within any given period 
(expressed as hourly, daily, or yearly ridership).50 
 
Right to strike – the right of employees represented by a collective bargaining unit to 
engage in a work stoppage if negotiations reach an impasse (in most states this 
is not applicable to public transit system employees, i.e., it is illegal for such 
employees to strike the publicly owned system that employs them).51 
 
Route – 1.  The geographical path followed by a vehicle or traveler from start to finish of 
a given trip; several routes may traverse a single portion of road or line. 2. In 
traffic assignments, a continuous group of links that connects two centroids, 
normally the path that requires the minimum time to traverse.52 
 
Run – 1.  The trip of a transit vehicle in one direction from the beginning of a route to the 
end of it. 2. A transit driver‘s assignment of trips for a day of operation. 
 Base (straight run) – a regular run that has no unpaid breaks and is normally 8 
h in duration.53 
 
Section 13c – a section of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 related to labor 
protection that is designed to protect transit employees against any worsening of 
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their position with respect to their employment as a result of assistance granted 
to any organization under the provisions of the act.54 
 
Stop – a waiting, boarding, and alighting area, usually designated by distinctive signs 
and by curb or pavement markings.55 
 
Strike (walkout) – a temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees (not 
necessarily members of a union) that is designed to express a grievance, enforce 
a demand for changes in the conditions of employment, obtain recognition, or 
resolve a dispute with management. 
 Wildcat – a strike that is not sanctioned by the union and that violates an 
agreement.56 
 
Transit, public (mass transit) – passenger transportation service, usually local, that is 
available to any person who pays a prescribed fare; it operates on established 
schedules along designated routes with specific stops (e.g., bus, light rail, rapid 
transit).57 
 
Transportation system – a system that provides for the movement of people and 
goods. 
 Balanced – a system in which all facilities and services for intrametropolitan 
travel are treated as part of a single system and each component is planned in a 
manner that most effectively uses its special characteristics in combination with 
other elements. 
 Urban – the system of elements that supports the movement of people and 
goods in a city (e.g., transit services, highways, traffic engineering, and 
operations), including both private and publicly owned carriers.58 
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